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Economic agents often operate in environments with market imperfections and
agency frictions. For instance, firms are controlled by managers and owned by atom-
istic investors, distorting incentives and resource allocation when corporate gover-
nance is weak. Or businesses participating in the market for corporate control face
asymmetric information or search and matching costs. The effects of these frictions
are often amplified or mitigated by the quality of economic institutions in a country.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the precise channels through which
the interaction of institutional quality and market frictions influence macroeconomic
variables such as output, investment, and asset ownership.
In the first chapter, I explore the relationship between the long-standing equity
home bias puzzle and the quality of economic institutions. I document a novel styl-
ized fact about home bias: countries with weaker institutions also hold fewer foreign
assets. I then build an international asset pricing model that has a counter-intuitive
implication: outside investors who reside in countries with weaker institutions find
it optimal to hold more of their own country’s assets. I go on to show that this is
because domestic assets provide a better hedge against their labor income risk in
countries with weak institutions when there are agency problems within firms.
The second chapter, based on joint work with Linda Tesar and Ron Alquist, looks
at foreign direct investment (FDI) in the form of mergers and acquisitions during
the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. Using both parametric and non-parametric
survival-analysis techniques, we find that the survival-times of foreign acquisitions
iv
in crisis-hit countries, versus countries less affected by the crisis, were shorter than
domestic ones, and that pairings between firms from different sectors, and acquisitions
by foreign financial firms were less likely to last if conducted during the crisis. By
way of a simple model of matching between acquiring and target firms, we argue that
this happens due to the reduced quality of the match between acquiring and target
firms during financial crises.
The final chapter of this dissertation establishes a set of stylized facts about the
relationship between institutional quality, macroeconomic volatility, the distribution
of firm sizes, and financial development in a large cross-section of countries.
The interaction of economic systems with domestic institutions of varying quality
is a key characteristic of the international economy today. Though most market-based
economic activity occurs in a handful of countries with similar, well-developed capital
markets, nations where institutional quality is relatively weak are playing an increas-
ingly important role in international business cycles and capital movements. Thus,
understanding how agency problems and institutions affect macroeconomic aggre-
gates, portfolio investment, and FDI constitutes an important set of open questions
that this dissertation addresses.
v
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ABSTRACT
Firms and investors often operate in environments with market imperfections and
agency frictions. It is common wisdom that the effects of these microeconomic fric-
tions are amplified or mitigated by the quality of economic institutions in a coun-
try. Yet little is known about the precise channels through which institutions in-
fluence macroeconomic outcomes. The first chapter of this dissertation documents
a novel stylized fact: countries with weaker institutions hold fewer foreign assets.
It then highlights a new mechanism, the hedging of labor income risk in the pres-
ence of agency problems, by which weak institutional quality affects the composition
of country asset portfolios. The second chapter looks at FDI in the form of merg-
ers and acquisitions (MA) during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. We find
evidence that crisis-time MA between foreign acquiring firms and domestic targets
were of lower longevity in crisis-affected countries. Using a simple model of match-
ing between acquiring and target firms, we then argue that this was due to reduced
match quality during the crisis. The third chapter establishes a set of stylized facts
about the relationship between institutional quality, macroeconomic volatility, firm
size distribution, and financial development in a large cross-section of countries.
xv
CHAPTER I
Country Portfolios with Imperfect Corporate
Governance
1.1 Introduction
Equity home bias is one of the most enduring puzzles in international finance.
This paper uncovers a novel stylized fact about home bias: countries with lower
institutional quality (“the South”) also hold fewer foreign assets.1 This appears
counter-intuitive. Why would countries with worse domestic institutions be more
home-biased in their equity holdings, while having apparently better alternatives in
countries with better institutions (“the North”)? The central contribution of this
paper is to show that this striking pattern might actually be an equilibrium outcome
of agency problems in the South.
To better understand the crucial role of agency problems, I start with the obser-
vation that the shares of a firm are typically held by two different kinds of agents,
outsiders and insiders. An outsider is an investor who owns stock in a firm but has no
direct control over its operations. A large part of her income comes from supplying
labor. In short, she fits the description of the classical atomistic agent in a business
1Institutional quality, measured by the indices from Kaufmann et al. (2008), refers to aspects
of the economic environment such as the standard of general governance, the strength of contract
enforcement, or the efficiency of the judicial system.
1
cycle model. By contrast, an insider is a large shareholder who has control over the
investment, dividend, and employment policies of a firm by virtue of her sizeable
equity stake. Weaker institutions lower the ability of outsiders to hold insiders ac-
countable for their decisions through the usual mechanisms of corporate governance.
I label this “imperfect corporate governance.”
With this structure in mind, I develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model of international portfolio choice with two distinct agents
in each country – an outsider and an insider. I incorporate the conflict of interest
that arises between these two parties when the latter has full control of the firm, yet
owns only a part of it. Weaker institutions, by opening up opportunities for self-
interested behavior by insiders, affect the payoffs of claims to the firm’s dividends.
This influences the portfolio choice of both outsiders and insiders, yielding two main
results. First, I find that for a given size of the float portfolio,2 domestic outsiders
will exhibit greater home bias in asset holdings in countries with weaker institutions.
Second, in addition to this, worse institutions will make the domestic float portfolio
itself smaller. The aggregate home bias in each country will then be the sum of these
two elements.
The first result, that Southern outsiders are more home biased for a given float
portfolio, follows from the impact of imperfect corporate governance on the ability of
domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. The hedging properties of domestic as-
sets have been examined as a possible explanation of home bias by Cole and Obstfeld
(1991), Baxter and Jermann (1997), van Wincoop and Warnock (2006), Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2008), Heathcote and Perri (2009), and Coeurdacier et al. (2009),
among others. Building especially on the last two, I show that imperfect corpo-
rate governance makes domestic assets a better hedge against labor income risk in
countries with worse institutions. The mechanism, working primarily through the
2The float portfolio is a term used to describe the fraction of the Southern market portfolio
actually traded in world equity markets, that is, the part not held by insiders.
2
dynamics of investment, plays itself out as follows. Consider the case of the South
while holding the level of insider ownership constant. Insiders here can extract rents
from firms as private benefits of control. Since more rents can be extracted from
larger firms, they become “empire-builders.”3 Empire-building affects the dynamics
of investment in the following way. With a persistent productivity process, insiders
anticipate a favorable shock to last for several periods. Hence, they find it privately
optimal to reduce dividends below the first-best level to finance socially suboptimal
capital investments in expectation of higher future private benefits. At the same time,
a good productivity shock tends to increase labor income in the South, relative to the
North, for two reasons. First, there is equilibrium over-employment in the Southern
representative firm, resulting from higher investment. Second, the sharper increase in
demand for domestic investment buffers the decline in South’s terms of trade that fol-
lows a favorable supply shock. This contributes to an increase in the relative value of
Southern labor income. Thus, imperfect corporate governance amplifies the negative
correlation between dividends on the domestic asset and labor earnings in the South.
Consequently, home bias for domestic outside investors is greater in the South, due
to their increased demand for domestic shares for the purpose of hedging their labor
income risk. In general equilibrium, this also leads to lower Northern ownership of
the Southern float portfolio.
The second result, that the South also has greater insider ownership of firms, and
hence, a smaller float portfolio, works through a channel that has been studied by
Admati et al. (1994) and DeMarzo and Urošević (2006).4 As noted earlier, weaker
institutions in the South let domestic insiders extract private benefits of control.
Lower insider equity, by reducing the insider’s ownership of cash-flow rights of the
3This is a version of the free-cash flow problem first pointed out by Jensen (1986). Private benefits
of control could vary from outright pilferage of firm assets, to more subtle forms like product discounts
to subsidiaries and share sales at low prices to related parties. See Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales
(2006), and Albuquerque and Schroth (2009) for empirical estimates of private benefits.
4These papers study the asset pricing problem of a large shareholder in a partial equilibrium
environment.
3
firm, increases extraction. Thus, risk-averse Southern insiders, wishing to diversify
country-specific risk by buying foreign assets, can only sell their stake at a discount;
outside investors, anticipating greater extraction, are only willing to trade shares
with the insider at lower prices.5 This acts as an endogenous “transaction tax” on
the insider’s portfolio adjustments. The insider’s trade-off, between the potential
benefits of diversification and the penalty of the transaction tax, determines the size
of the float portfolio of a country. Since the effect of the transaction tax dominates
in the Southern equilibrium, it ends up with more insider ownership. This outcome
can be thought of as home bias on the part of insiders.
While insider ownership and the agency problems associated with private benefits
of control have long been central to the finance literature (see LaPorta et al. (1998b,
1999, 2000a,b, 2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Nenova (2003), and Dyck and
Zingales (2006)), these have not yet been incorporated into international macroeco-
nomics.6 To the best of my knowledge, this paper presents the first international real
business cycle model with labor income and endogenous asset returns that character-
izes outsider holdings and insider ownership in the presence of agency issues.
I show how poor institutions may amplify the effects of a well-known candidate
explanation of home bias, non-diversifiable labor income risk. For this, I draw on
insights from two lines of research. The first is the literature concerning the im-
plications of agency problems on asset-pricing (Dow et al. (2005), Albuquerque and
Wang (2006, 2008)) and macroeconomic aggregates (Danthine and Donaldson (2005),
Philippon (2006)). My results address international portfolio allocation in the back-
drop of this literature. The second is the recent work of Heathcote and Perri (2009)
and Coeurdacier et al. (2009) that has focussed on the interaction of trade openness
and labor income risk to explain the home bias puzzle. In contrast, I emphasize a
different channel, institutional quality, through which labor income risk determines
5The price corresponds to the lower post-trade level of insider ownership.
6Albuquerque and Wang (2006) is a notable exception.
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home bias.7 Thus, this paper brings together two areas in international macroeco-
nomics and finance that have, surprisingly, remained separate until now.
In this context, one of the most important results of this paper is that imperfect
corporate governance helps in resolving the asset home bias puzzle not only by lim-
iting the size of the world float portfolio, but also by affecting its ownership pattern.
Contrary to intuition, I find that domestic outside investors in countries with weaker
institutions will hold more of their own country’s float portfolio because it has weaker
institutions. This paints a nuanced picture of the connection between insider owner-
ship and home bias, a connection first described in Dahlquist et al. (2003) and Kho
et al. (2006).
Building on the empirical research program of Faria et al. (2007) and Faria and
Mauro (2009), this paper uncovers a new stylized fact about international asset hold-
ings. It also contributes to the growing literature on the effects of institutions on
economic outcomes such as financial development (LaPorta et al. (1997), LaPorta
et al. (1998a)) by focusing on institutional heterogeneity in an international asset
pricing framework. My work is also related to the extensive literature on financial
integration and risk sharing in the presence of financial frictions, exemplified by the
work of Kehoe and Perri (2002), Bekaert and Harvey (2003), Levchenko (2005), Kraay
et al. (2005), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2008), Broner and Ventura (2008, 2009), Bai and
Zhang (2008), Broner et al. (2008), and Kose et al. (2009), among others. The papers
most closely related to my work are Heathcote and Perri (2009), Albuquerque and
Wang (2006, 2008), and Coeurdacier et al. (2009). I discuss the connections between
my results and theirs in more detail in a later section.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 establishes a new em-
7Levy and Sarnat (1970), Tesar and Werner (1995), Lewis (1999), Warnock (2002), Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and Sørensen et al. (2007) have documented the asset home bias puzzle
over the years. Some theoretical explanations of equity home bias in the finance and international
macroeconomics literature are Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Uppal (1993), Stockman and Tesar (1995),
Brennan and Cao (1997), Baxter and Jermann (1997), Baxter et al. (1998), Engel and Matsumoto
(2006), Coeurdacier (2008), Heathcote and Perri (2009), and Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009).
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pirical regularity about the cross section of country portfolios and reviews some that
are well-known. Section 1.3 lays out a dynamic model of portfolio choice by outsider
investors with exogenous insider ownership. Section 1.4 presents the main results of
the paper and provides intuition for them. Section 1.5 discusses an extension with
endogenous insider ownership. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Stylized facts
This section makes two points. The first is that countries with weaker local
institutions hold fewer foreign assets relative to their size. They also issue fewer
foreign liabilities relative to their size, a fact that has been noted by Faria and Mauro
(2009). The second is that, countries with weaker institutions have more insider
ownership of their firms, first pointed out by LaPorta et al. (1999).
1.2.1 Data description
I look at the years 1996-2004 because that is the period of overlap of my two main
sources of data: external wealth measures for the years 1970-2004 from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and institutional quality indices for the years 1996-2007 from
Kaufmann et al. (2008). The data sources are summarized in the appendix (A.1.1).
Since the theoretical mechanism in the model is likely to be important only for those
countries that make significant use of external financing for firms, I use the sample of
LaPorta et al. (1999) with a few modifications.8 The resultant group of 43 countries
(21 developed markets, 22 emerging markets by the Financial Times Stock Exchange
(FTSE) classification) retains significant heterogeneity in institutional quality.
I focus on portfolio and foreign direct investment as these financial claims have
8Specifically, I include countries that had at least 5 domestic non-financial publicly traded firms
with no government ownership in 1993. I exclude Luxembourg, Ireland and Switzerland from the
analysis because their gross external positions are unusually large in relation to their GDP due to
their status as financial centers. The countries are listed in the appendix.
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explicit equity attached to them, unlike debt. I construct two measures of diversi-
fication using the gross equity (portfolio and foreign direct investment) assets and
liabilities held by a country’s nationals, deflated by the size of a country’s economy
measured by its gross domestic product. I take the simple average of these measures
over the year 1996-2004 to get the cross-section of holdings. My measure of the qual-
ity of institutions is the simple average of the six indices in Kaufmann et al. (2008)
that quantify general governance, the degree of corruption, the rule of law, political
stability, effectiveness of regulations, and the strength of media and public opinion.
The index so constructed ranges from -1.21 to 1.78 in my sample, with higher scores
assigned to countries with better institutional quality.9
1.2.2 Two stylized facts
Stylized fact 1. Better institutional quality in a country is associated with greater
foreign assets and liabilities for that country.
Figure 1 draws a scatter plot with institutional quality on the horizontal axis
and two measures of international diversification on the vertical axis. The mea-
sures of international diversification are the ratios of foreign assets (and liabilities) to
gross domestic product. The world distribution of assets and liabilities suggest that
countries with better domestic institutions are also better diversified using greater
cross-holdings.10
9These are meant to capture the quality of local economic institutions, rather then specific in-
vestor protection laws. Laws are effective only when enforced, and enforcement is dependent mainly
institutional quality. For example, common law countries typically have better investor protection
codified in their laws; yet the list of common law countries includes Zimbabwe, where such laws can
hardly be expected to be useful. On the other hand, the list of civil law, where investor protec-
tion laws are generally weaker, includes Germany, where the existent laws would possibly be better
implemented than in a lot of common law nations.
10In OLS regressions reported in appendix A (A.2), institutions remain significant after control-
ling for factors that have been shown in the empirical literature to be important determinants of
international diversification (Dahlquist et al. (2003), Kho et al. (2006), Faria et al. (2007), Coeur-
dacier (2008)), such as country size (GDP), the level of general development (per capita GDP),
openness to trade (share of total trade in GDP), the level of financial development (domestic credit
to GDP ratio), financial openness (Chinn and Ito (2008) index), and insider ownership (fraction of
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Figure 1.1: Better institutions associated with more foreign equity assets and liabili-
ties. Each point represents the time average (1996-2004) for each country.
Institutional quality measured by the Kaufmann et al. (2008) indices on
the x-axis. The ratio of foreign equity assets (liabilities) to GDP in panel
1 (2) on the y-axis. Data source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and
Kaufmann et al. (2008).
Stylized fact 2. Better institutional quality in a country is associated with lower
insider ownership in that country.
The first panel of figure 2 plots the percentage of market capitalization of a country
closely held, versus institutional quality, using a subset of 34 countries for which
insider ownership data has been compiled by Kho et al. (2006). This shows countries
having better institutional quality also exhibiting lower insider ownership. The second
panel of figure 2 plots the ratio of foreign equity assets plus liabilities to GDP on the
market capitalization closely held). The adjusted R-squares of the fitted lines are about 70%. The
regressions for equity liabilities for my sample yield similar results to those reported by Faria et al.
(2007) and Faria and Mauro (2009). Year-by-year regressions for the cross section (not reported
here) show that the coefficient on the institutional index has grown larger over the sample period.
I do not pursue a time-series analysis of how changes in diversification may have been affected by
changes in institutional quality. This is because the time-variation in the institutional quality index
for each country is much smaller than the variation across countries. The cross-sectional variance of
institutional quality ranges from roughly 4 to 100 times the variance for individual countries.
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Figure 1.2: Better institutions associated with lower insider ownership; lower insider
ownership associated with greater diversification. Each point represents
the time average (1996-2004) for each country. Institutional quality mea-
sured by the Kaufmann et al. (2008) indices on the x-axis of panel 1. The
value-weighted average percentage insider ownership in a country’s firms
on y-axis in panel 1 and x-axis of panel 2. The ratio of foreign equity as-
sets and liabilities to GDP on y-axis in panel 2. Data source: Kho et al.
(2006), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Kaufmann et al. (2008).
vertical axis versus insider ownership. It makes a point about insider ownership and
international risk sharing – the greater the fraction of financial claims on a nation
available to be held by outsiders, the more internationally diversified a nation is.
That is, freeing up a greater fraction of the float portfolio for outside investors leads
to greater foreign cross holdings. Not all the freed domestic liabilities are held by
domestic residents. Nor is all the freed wealth re-invested locally, as some of it finds
its way abroad as an accumulation of foreign assets.
These facts raise several questions about portfolio allocation when insiders and
outsiders co-exist. For instance, given a certain amount of insider ownership, what
is the composition of ownership of foreign versus domestic investors? What will
9
happen when institutional quality improves in the South? Will the effects be felt
mostly through an expansion of the world float portfolio, or also through portfolio
adjustments by outsiders? I try to address these questions in a dynamic framework
with insiders and outsiders.
1.3 A model of outsider portfolios with exogenous insider
ownership
This section lays out a model of international portfolio choice by outsiders with
endogenous labor supply and asset returns. It extends the basic two-country, two-
good framework developed by Backus et al. (1995) by embedding in it the free-cash-
flow problem of Jensen (1986). The agency problem is incorporated in reduced form
for analytical tractability, as in Albuquerque and Wang (2008). In what follows, I
describe the economic environment in (1.3.1), the optimization problems of the agents
in (1.3.2), and the concept of equilibrium in (1.3.3).
1.3.1 Setup
1.3.1.1 Countries, firms and agents
There are two countries in the world – North and South. North and South may
differ in the quality of their institutions, with the South having weaker institutions.
Institutional quality is modeled in a very specific way that will be described in detail
later. In each country, there is one firm which produces an internationally traded
intermediate good. There are four agents in the world, two agents in each of the
two countries. One of them, labeled the insider, derives utility from consumption,
and does not supply labor inputs. Her only source of income are dividends from the
shares she owns in her own country’s firm, and private benefits of control, a concept
that will be clarified later. The other agent, the outsider, is a worker-investor. She
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earns wages from working in her own country’s firm. She also has dividend income
from the shares she holds in the domestic firm and the foreign firm.
1.3.1.2 The goods market
Each country produces an internationally traded intermediate good using capital
(K) and labor (L). a(st) is produced only in the North, and b(st) only in the South.11
Except for the total output of the intermediate goods in the North and the South,
which are denoted by Ya and Yb respectively, all quantities associated with the South
are superscripted with a “*”. The production functions for the intermediate goods
are
Ya(s
t) = Z(st)K(st−1)θL(st)1−θ (1.1)
Yb(s
t) = Z∗(st)K∗(st−1)θL∗(st)1−θ (1.2)
The only source of uncertainty is the technology in the intermediate goods sector of
each country, described by the stochastic processes Z(st) and Z∗(st). These evolve




∗(st−1)) + ε(st) (1.3)
log(Z∗(st)) = ρ22log(Z
∗(st−1)) + ρ21log(Z(s
t−1)) + ε∗(st) (1.4)
Both intermediate goods are used in the production of the final consumption-investment
good in each country. The two intermediates are combined using a Cobb-Douglas
11A reminder of standard notation: at each time t, the economy is in state st ∈ S, where S is
the set of possible states of the world. The sequence of events from the start of time till date t is
denoted by the history st.
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technology that is not subject to uncertainty
Y (st) = a(st)ωb(st)1−ω (1.5)





This sets the elasticity of substitution between Northern and Southern intermediates
to unity. A constant fraction of the value of final output is used in the purchases
of each intermediate input. The Cobb-Douglas assumption is relaxed later. ω and
ω∗ are assumed to be greater than 1
2
to reflect an exogenous preference for domestic
intermediates.
Let the price of the Northern and Southern intermediate be pa and pb, and the price















intermediates prices in each country in units of the local final good. The real exchange
rate between the two countries, which is defined as the price of the Southern final













by the law of one price for the traded intermediate goods. Defined this way, a depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate for North is an increase in its algebraic value. The
terms of trade for North, similarly, is defined as the price of its imports divided by







so that an improvement in North’s terms of trade is a decline in the algebraic value
of t(st).
1.3.1.3 Asset markets
There are two assets in fixed supply, equity in the Northern intermediate goods
firm, and equity in the Southern intermediate goods firm. The supply of both assets
is normalized to unity. Firms are entirely equity financed. Agents do not have access
to a full range of Arrow-Debreu contingent claims, and can save and share risks by
holding these two assets at most.
Definition 1. A holder of an equity contract in the Northern (Southern) intermediate
goods firm is entitled to dividend D(st) (D∗(st)) at time t after the history of events
st, paid in units of the final good of the country in which the firm is located.
Let λij(st) (where i, j = N,S) denote the share of country j equity held by outsiders
of country i. α(st) and α∗(st) denote ownership of own-country equity by the insider
in the North and the South. Thus, asset market clearing requires
λNN(s
t) + λSN(s
t) + α(st) = 1 (1.10)
λNS(s
t) + λSS(s
t) + α∗(st) = 1 (1.11)
1.3.1.4 Description of agents: Insiders
This section lays out a bare bones description of the insider’s optimization prob-
lem. A more complete discussion of how the insider affects the equilibrium comes in
a later section (1.4.1). The insider has sole authority over the decisions of the rep-
resentative domestic firm. I assume for the moment that the insider owns a fraction
α of the firm’s equity, but cannot perform asset trades, so that she has her entire
wealth invested in domestic equity. The insider has the following period-wise flow of
income and consumption in the North.
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M(st) = αD(st) + qa(s
t)f(st)Ya(s
t)− Φ(st) (1.12)
where dividends, D(st) are defined by
D(st) = qa(s
t)[{1− f(st)}{Ya(st)}−W (st)L(st)]−{K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)} (1.13)
f(st) is the fraction of output extracted as private benefits of control, and Φ(st) is
the deadweight cost to the insider for doing so.12 The cost of stealing is assumed to







which is quadratic in the fraction stolen and linear in the scale of stealing.13 It depends
on a parameter η, which captures institutional quality. Higher values of η correspond
to better institutional quality.14The value of η may differ between the North and the
South to reflect differences in institutional quality. When η differs between the two
countries, it will be lower in the South.
Let us consider the insider’s problem in the North. She chooses {I(st), D(st), L(st), f(st)}∞0 ,15
which are investments, dividends, labor demand, and fraction of output extracted as
12Think of Φ as monetary bribes, the costs of running front companies, doctoring accounts or
paying court-mandated fines in the event of litigation. I assume that this output is simply burnt
and does not enter the consumption stream of any other agent.
13Fractional private benefits of control and a quadratic cost-of-stealing function are common mod-
eling devices used in the corporate finance literature. See Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and Kim and
Durnev (2005) for empirical implementations, and Albuquerque and Wang (2008) for an example of
a recent DSGE model which uses these functional forms to model the free cash flow problem.
14In other words, private benefits of control are easier to extract in certain countries due to
institutional failures. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Nenova (2003) and Dyck and
Zingales (2006). Conversely, better institutions make it easier for outside investors to extract the
free cash flow of a firm in the form of dividends, as in LaPorta et al. (2000b), and Dittmar et al.
(2003).
15Note that in this section of the paper, the insider does not choose her own level of ownership.
Endogenous insider ownership is explored in a later section.
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t)f(st)Y (st)− Φ(st)) (1.15)
where Q(st) is the stochastic discount factor that the insider uses to price her own





where U(M(st)) = log(M(st)) is the utility function of the insider, defined only over
consumption. The Southern insider has a similar problem.
There are two forces of misalignment at work here: the assumption that the
insider maximizes with respect only to her own flow of consumption, not the stream
of dividends; and the discount factor used to value this consumption stream. Perfect
alignment of interests amounts to the insider maximizing dividends with respect to the
correct discount factor, which could be a ownership-weighted average of insider and
outsider marginal utilities. I assume the polar opposite, that the stochastic discount
factor in question does not heed the ownership of outsiders, and the insider maximizes
her own consumption stream.16
1.3.1.5 Description of agents: Outsiders
There are two representative outsiders in the model, one a resident of the North
and the other residing in the South. They have preferences over the final con-
sumption good produced in their own country and leisure. The two outsiders take
the wage earned at the domestic firm and the flow of dividends from the two rep-
resentative intermediate goods firms as given and choose a sequence of consump-
16See Danthine and Donaldson (2005) for a discussion on the alignment of discount factors between
owners and managers. Quite intuitively, they find that an optimal remuneration package for the
manager involves a component that is a function of aggregate labor income.
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tion, labor supply and asset holdings. For example, the Northern outsider chooses









subject to the period-wise budget constraint
C(st) + P (st)(λNN(s
t)− λNN(st−1)) + e(st)P ∗(st)(λNS(st)− λNS(st−1))
= qa(s




We can also write this budget constraint in terms of a state variable, the outsider’s
financial wealth, and asset returns. Define financial wealth of the Northern outsider,
Λ(st), as the value of total holdings of assets after history st,
Λ(st) ≡ P (st)λNN(st) + P ∗(st)λNS(st) ≡ ΛNN(st) + ΛNS(st) (1.18)
and asset returns in units of the local final good as








The budget constraint of the Northern outsider can then be written as
Λ(st) = qa(s






t)W (st)L(st) + Λ(st−1) ˜R(st)− C(st) (1.22)






e(st)R∗(st) is the weighted average return
on the entire portfolio.
The felicity function is U(C(st)) = log(C(st)) − V (L(st)), an assumption that is
relaxed later.
1.3.1.6 Optimal combination of intermediate goods
The optimal combination of the two intermediate goods can be found by think-
ing of a proxy final goods firm in each country that takes input prices qa(s
t) and
qb(s
t) as given to maximize profits every period. Thus their problem is static profit
maximization.
Π = max{a(st),b(st)}Y (a(s
t), b(st))− qa(st)a(st)− qb(st)b(st) (1.23)
Π∗ = max{a∗(st),b∗(st)}Y
∗(a∗(st), b∗(st))− q∗a(st)a∗(st)− q∗b (st)b∗(st) (1.24)
Having a final goods firm in each country is just a convenient way to bypass
specifying a price index for final consumption for each country. The real exchange rate
between the two countries, which is defined as the relative price of their consumption
bundles, is the same whether we model the aggregation as taking place in a final
goods sector or in the utility function of the individual. Therefore, the final goods
sector plays absolutely no role in any of the qualitative or quantitative results that
follow.
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1.3.2 First order and market clearing conditions
First, I set out the optimality and market clearing conditions of the decentralized
economy, and then define the concept of equilibrium in the next section.
1.3.2.1 First order conditions for the insider’s problem
The Northern insider observes the history of states up to the period t, st, and forms
expectations on the future state st+1. Then she decides on investment, employment













+ (1− δ)] = 1 (1.25)
This is the inter-temporal optimality condition for investment. Since the cash-flow
ownership of the insider is limited to α, she bears only a fraction of the costs of
investment. But private benefits of control extracted are a fraction of the revenue of
the firm. Thus she assigns a higher-than-optimal weight to returns on capital, over
and above the normal marginal product of capital, θ qaYa
K
. This is because her private
pay-off from capital comes through dividends and private benefits.








This is the period-wise labor demand function. Observe that the agency problem











The last equation states that the insider steals a constant fraction of output in each
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period and state, which follows directly from the quadratic cost of stealing that I
assume. This simplifies the analysis substantially. There are a similar set of conditions
for the South.
Remark 1. The expression (1 + (1−α)
2
2αη
) that appears in the first two optimality con-
ditions of the insider is the gross payoff (before deducting the insider’s share of labor
and investment costs) to the insider from dividends and private benefits of control
(net costs of extracting that benefit) per unit of cash flow rights held. This payoff is
lower, the better is the quality of domestic institutions (higher η).
Two conditions need to be imposed on the parameter η for the solution to be
economically meaningful. The first is trivial, that the fraction of output consumed
as private benefits should not exceed 1. Also, the optimal solution to the investment
problem should not require infusion of new funds from investors in the steady state,
which would make steady state dividends and stock prices negative. Obviously, en-
suring the second condition is sufficient for the first to hold. Note that the condition
holding in the non-stochastic steady state does not ensure that dividends are positive
for all states of nature.
Assumption 1. For given insider ownership α and α∗, the institutional quality pa-
rameters η and η∗ are high enough so that dividends are non-negative in the steady
state. These values are provided in the appendix.
1.3.2.2 First order conditions for the outsider’s problem
The outsider observes the history of states up to the period t, st, and forms ex-
pectations on the future state st+1. Since expectations are rational, she can implicitly
calculate expected dividend policy and current labor demand of the insider. She then
solves for her own optimal consumption, labor supply and asset allocation, given the
insider’s behavior. The first order conditions for the outsiders are standard. The
Northern outsider has the following optimality conditions for stock purchases
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t)W (st) + UL(s
t) ≥ 0
= 0 if L(st) > 0 (1.30)
There are a similar set of conditions for the South.
1.3.2.3 First order conditions for optimal combination of intermediates
goods
The hypothetical final goods firms buy the two intermediate inputs in spot mar-
kets. Their optimality conditions for the use of inputs are
ωY (st) = qa(s
t)a(st) (1.31)
(1− ω)Y (st) = qb(st)b(st) (1.32)
such that the fraction of final output used to pay for intermediates is constant.
There are a similar set of conditions for the South. I stress again at this point that
the introduction of the final goods firm is just an expositional tool. These “firms” do
not have any profits, do not employ capital or labor, and just serve as a proxy for the
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deterministic technology for assembling final goods from the two traded intermediates.
In short, they play absolutely no substantive role in this model economy.
1.3.2.4 Market clearing conditions
Relative prices of intermediate goods, qa(s
t) and qb(s
t) adjust such that
a(st) + a∗(st) = Ya(s
t) (1.33)
b(st) + b∗(st) = Yb(s
t) (1.34)
The final consumption good market clearing requires
C(st) +K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1) +M(st) = Y (st)− Φ(st) (1.35)
Cm∗(s
t) +K∗(st)− (1− δ)K∗(st−1) +M∗(st) = Y ∗(st)− Φ∗(st) (1.36)
so that consumption demand by the representative outsider, investment demand and
the consumption of the insider add up to the output of final goods.
Stock market clearing requires that
λNN(s
t) + λSN(s
t) = 1− α(st) (1.37)
λNS(s
t) + λSS(s
t) = 1− α∗(st) (1.38)
so that the total shares held by outsiders in a country’s firms is constrained by the
holdings of the insider. The fractions (1 − α(st)) and (1 − α∗(st)) are the float
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portfolios in the North and the South.
1.3.3 Definition of equilibrium





t), and e(st) for all st and t satisfying the following
conditions
1. The insider’s investment, employment and private benefits optimality conditions
(1.25), (1.26) and (1.27) hold in the North. Analogous conditions hold in the South.
2. The outsider’s stock purchase and labor supply optimality conditions (1.28), (1.29)
and (1.30) hold in the North. Analogous conditions hold in the South.
3. Intermediate inputs are combined optimally according to conditions (1.31) and
(1.32) in the North. Analogous conditions hold in the South.
4. Intermediate inputs resource constraints (1.33) and (1.34) hold worldwide.
5. Final goods resource constraints (1.35) and (1.36) hold in each country.
6. Asset markets clear according to constraints (1.37) and (1.38).
In the equilibrium defined above, insiders make decisions regarding the investment,
dividends, and labor demand of the intermediate goods firms. How their decisions
influence the equilibrium is discussed in the following section (1.4.1). Outsiders take
these decision rules as known and given, and formulate their consumption and labor
supply plans. Additionally, they decide how much of their financial wealth to invest
in each of the two available assets. Section (1.4.2) explores these portfolio shares.
1.4 Outsider portfolios
This section presents the key insights from the model regarding the general equi-
librium effect of institutional quality and insider ownership on outsider portfolios. I
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first discuss in section 1.4.1 how the insider’s decisions influence the second moments
of variables that are crucial for the outsider’s portfolio decision. I then provide analyt-
ical solutions to the portfolio allocation problem of outside investors in terms of these
second moments in section (1.4.2), for an exogenous amount of insider ownership.
This is done under some simplifying assumptions – countries are symmetric, agents
have logarithmic utility in consumption, and the final good is a Cobb-Douglas aggre-
gate of intermediate goods. These analytical solutions show the direct link between
the insiders’ investment decisions and outsider portfolios. I then implement a numer-
ical technique to solve for asset prices and outsider portfolios for general functional
forms in (1.4.4) and (1.4.5). Armed with these tools, I next define an equilibrium in
which insider portfolios are endogenous, and solve for equilibrium holdings of both
insiders and outsiders in section (1.5).
1.4.1 How does the insider influence the equilibrium?
The insider’s consumption M(st) has three components,
αD(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸















revenue net of private benefit
−qa(st)W (st)L(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor costs
−{K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
investment
The agency problem in the model stems from the insider’s limited ownership of the
firm and her ability to extract private benefits of control. Because the insider owns
only a fraction α of the firm, in effect (1 − α) of her private benefits come from
revenues that rightfully belongs to outsiders. The larger the share (1− α) owned by
outsiders, the greater the incentive to steal. Thus, the optimal extraction of private
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benefits of control declines with greater insider ownership and increases with greater
outsider ownership as in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) and Albuquerque and Wang




Multiplying the expression for dividends by the insider’s ownership share α and in-
specting the last two terms, we see that the insider pays for only a fraction α of the
labor and investment cost of the firm due to her limited ownership.
−α{qa(st)W (st)L(st)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
insider share of labor costs
−α{K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
insider share of investment
Since private benefits are proportional to firm size by assumption and the higher
costs of a larger firm are partly subsidized by outside owners, the insider has an
incentive to over-invest. Capital and labor being imperfect substitutes in production,
a higher equilibrium capital stock also requires higher equilibrium employment. This
distinguishes the agency aspect of the model in this paper from Albuquerque and
Wang (2008), who focus only on over-investment.
As noted by these authors, there is also a separate reason that might make the
insider reluctant to over-invest. Since the insider is risk averse and her consump-
tion stream is derived entirely from the firm, over-investment reduces her utility by
increasing the volatility of her consumption stream. Recall that the insider is not
allowed to trade in other assets. This makes asset markets incomplete for the insider,
because she has to insure against the two shocks in the world economy using a single
asset, her fixed holdings in her own firm. This form of financial market incomplete-
ness has real effects because the insider attempts to insure herself by affecting the
pay-offs to the asset she holds. However, in their model as in this one, the incentive
to over-investment dominates in equilibrium.
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1.4.1.1 How does the insider affect the outsiders’ portfolios?
Because of similar goods and asset market setups, the model shares an important
feature of Heathcote and Perri (2009) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009): relative (to the
other country) labor income and asset income are negatively correlated. This result
comes from three interconnected channels. First, a positive productivity shock in
any country leads to an increase in labor income in that country. Second, it also
leads to a worsening of the terms of trade for that country because of an increase in
supply of the their intermediate good. This is the “automatic insurance” role of the
terms of trade emphasized by Cole and Obstfeld (1991). However, the dynamics of
investment dampens the decline in the terms of trade. Recall that the final investment
good is made from Northern and Southern intermediates. Since the technology for
producing the final good is biased towards domestic inputs, an increase in domestic
investment due to the positive shock to technology increases demand for the domestic
intermediate good, cushioning the worsening of the terms of trade. This leads to an
overall increase of the labor income in the country experiencing the positive technology
shock, relative to the other country. Third, the increase in domestic investment due
to the technology shock also leads to a contemporaneous decline in dividends, relative
to the other country. These three effects in conjunction induce a negative correlation
between domestic labor income and domestic dividend income.
The same forces are at work in the present model. However, the presence of the
insider serves as an amplifying mechanism in the connection between investment and
the income processes of outsiders. Following a good productivity shock that is known
to be persistent, insiders find it optimal to reduce dividends below first-best to fi-
nance privately optimal projects in expectation of higher future private benefits of
control. Figure 3 (1.4.1.1) shows the simulated labor income and dividend paths from
the model for the North and the South when the former has better institutions. In
a country with good institutions, labor income and dividends are weakly positively
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Figure 1.3: Southern dividends are relatively more volatile and negatively correlated
with labor income. The top and bottom panel show simulated dividend
and labor income paths in the North and South. The benchmark model
has perfect institutions in the North. The dividend process for the South
is for the model calibrated to the lowest decile of institutional quality.
correlated, whereas, this correlation is sharply negative in a country with poor gov-
ernance. Note that dividends are also more volatile in the South, the vertical axis in
each panel having different scales.17
1.4.2 Analytical solutions to the outsider’s portfolio allocation problem
In this section I follow Heathcote and Perri (2004, 2009) in making a number
of simplifying assumptions to solve for outsider’s portfolios. I assume that the two
countries are symmetric in all respects. I also assume that the technology that com-
bines Northern and Southern intermediates is Cobb-Douglas. Under these conditions,
a constant portfolio rule for outsiders is derived. The purpose of this proposition is
purely to provide intuition for the results of the numerical simulations that follow and
to highlight the main qualitative mechanisms at work. The more interesting case of
two countries with different institutional quality is explored numerically.18 The solu-
17Note that this diagram plots only dividends and labor income, not these variables relative to
the other country’s labor income and dividends.
18This problem, due to the ex-ante asymmetry of the countries in question, cannot be solved by
the simple algebra used in this section.
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tion in Proposition 1 can be thought of as equity positions that decentralize a central
planner’s problem that maximizes the equally weighted sum of outsider utilities, given
optimal behavior by the insiders in each country.
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium for this economy with own-country port-
folio share for outsiders, λNN = λSS = λ, such that the consumptions of outside
investors are equated across symmetric countries in all states of nature. The value







{ ψ0(2ω − 1)(1− α)
1− (1− ψ0)(2ω − 1)
} (1.39)
where




is labor’s share of total income.
Proof: See appendix. (A.3.2)
1.4.2.1 Intuition





which just says that the outsiders should hold half of the world float portfolio for
the purpose of diversification. This is the same dictum that a simple consumption-
based asset pricing model would deliver, which is to hold the world float portfolio
in proportion to the agent’s share in world wealth. Since only a fraction (1 − α) of
the world market portfolio is actually available for purchase, and by symmetry, each





The second piece is the part of the portfolio which hedges against labor-income
risk. As discussed in the previous section, the demand for this part of the portfolio
comes from the endogenous negative correlation between labor and dividend income.




{ ψ0(2ω − 1)(1− α)
1− (1− ψ0)(2ω − 1)
}
In this piece, ψ0 in the numerator is the share of labor income in GDP. This can be
seen most easily by inspecting the first order condition for labor employment (1.26)
and the expression for ψ0. Also observe that as we let the cost-of-stealing parameter,
η, go to very large values, ψ0 → (1 − θ), which is labor’s share of income in
the Cobb-Douglas production function. The higher labor income share ψ0 resulting
from beyond optimal firm sizes increases this term, augmenting the extent of home
bias.19 Thus, home bias in equity portfolios increases with declining institutional
quality due to increased demand for domestic shares from domestic residents for the
purpose of labor income risk hedging. This demonstrates one of the channels by
which the model generates cross sectional variation of asset holdings – the demand
for the hedging component of outsider portfolios is more in countries with weaker
institutions because there is more labor income to hedge. The other channel is an
endogenous increase in the covariance between relative labor and dividend income.
This channel is explored in the next section.
Note that there is no hedging demand when ω = 1
2
. When this is the case,
domestic investment is made up of equal proportions of the home and foreign in-
termediate. As described by Heathcote and Perri (2009), in this case increases in
investment demand translate into equal increases in demand for the domestic and
foreign intermediate goods, thereby having no terms of trade effects, ceteris paribus.
19Under perfect alignment of interests, perfect institutional quality, and insider ownership close to
zero, the portfolio described above converges to the portfolio in Heathcote and Perri (2009), which
is λ = ω+θ−2ωθ1+θ−2ωθ .
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In their model, the crucial feature that drives the home bias result is the asymmetry
of the two countries’ investment composition and its effect on the dynamics of the
real exchange rate.20 The investment and terms of trade channel is eliminated when
there is no home bias in investment.
In contrast, the mechanism of the present model is primarily driven by the asym-
metry in the countries’ institutions. In the case where we are able to solve for portfo-
lios analytically, this channel is eliminated completely because we assume that the two
countries have equally bad or good institutions. Thus, varying the institutional qual-
ity parameter in the symmetric case changes home bias by very little. But significant
quantitative effects are seen when the two countries are allowed to be asymmetric.
However, since this case has to be solved numerically, the purpose of Proposition 1
(and Proposition 2 in the next section) is to highlight the qualitative mechanism at
work – which is, the moments of certain endogenous variables.
1.4.2.2 Intuition using covariances of endogenous variables
Following Heathcote and Perri (2009), we can also write the portfolio as a covari-
ance ratio of key endogenous variables.















(1− θ)(ψ1 − ψ0)( 1β + δ − 1)− δ
and Ψ = L̄
D̄
, L = q̄aW̄ L̄ = Labor income, D = Dividends, ∆L̂ = L̂ − ê − L̂∗,
∆D̂ = D̂− ê− D̂∗. Hats over variables denote log deviations from symmetric steady
20In a related paper Civelli (2008) shows that what is crucial for the result is home bias in
investment, not all of domestic absorption.
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state values and bars above variables denote symmetric steady state values.
Proof: See appendix. (A.3.2)
As shown in a previous section, the presence of the insider affects the moments
of the model’s variables. Specifically, (i) it increases the relative volatility of the
domestic dividend process, making the domestic asset relatively riskier and therefore
less attractive to outsiders; (ii) it increases the covariance between relative labor and
dividend income, making the domestic asset a better hedge against labor income risk
and therefore more attractive to outsiders; (iii) it makes the steady state labor income
to dividend ratio L̄
D̄
higher, increasing the need to hedge labor income risk, thereby
making the domestic asset more attractive to outsiders. Since the effect of (ii) and
(iii) dominate (i), the hedge portfolio increases with worse institutional quality.
Common sense tells us that domestic equity capital should flee from countries that
have weaker institutions. This idea is captured by the volatility effect (i). However,
how much wealth is allocated to an asset depends not only on the relative variance
of its payoff but also on the covariance of this payoff with other sources of risk, effect
(ii) above. The remainder of the paper shows by numerical simulations that the effect
of these covariances overturns the riskiness of assets from the South, making them
desirable for Southern worker-investors.
1.4.3 Related literature
The papers that are closest to mine are Albuquerque and Wang (2006, 2008),
referred to as AW (2006) and AW (2008). AW (2006) study the investment and
exchange rate effects of investor protection. They solve for equilibrium consump-
tion allocations of outsiders under the assumption of asset market completeness and
find portfolios that support these allocations. In their equilibrium, outsiders in each
country hold claims on each other that are independent of the degree of investor
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protection. In the present paper, the focus is on portfolio allocation when the avail-
able assets are just equity in Northern and Southern firms. On the production side,
the present model uses labor inputs, and this brings inefficient employment as an
additional source of misalignment of incentives between insiders and outsiders. The
inclusion of labor turns out to have implications for hedging labor income risk, and
makes outsider portfolios dependent on institutional parameters.
AW (2008) is a closed economy variant of AW (2006) that examines the effects of
poor corporate governance on investment and output. It has a risk averse insider who
is allowed to trade in a risk-less asset and consumes dividend earnings plus private
benefits, and an outsider whose consumption is financed solely by domestic dividends.
The ratio of the marginal utilities of these two agents between different states and
dates turn out to be the same because of the underlying structure of logarithmic
utilities and linear private benefits, so that their marginal rates of substitutions coin-
cide. Thus, in equilibrium, there is no incentives for asset trade between insiders and
outsiders for any level of insider ownership, which is not true here because outsiders’
consumptions are also affected by pay-outs of the foreign equity that they hold in
equilibrium. Also, insiders have incentives to reduce holdings in their own firm for
the purpose of diversification due to the presence of a second risky security, foreign
equity. Thus, the focus of both AW (2006) and AW (2008) is on the cross-section
of macroeconomic aggregates like investment, stock market volatility, exchange rates
and stock prices, while I attempt to quantify the connection between institutional
quality and country portfolios.
The results on home bias presented in this paper are closely related to those
in Heathcote and Perri (2009), referred to as HP (2009). Specifically, the solution
in Proposition 1 approaches the portfolio in HP (2009) when three conditions are
satisfied: (i) institutional quality in both countries is perfect; (ii) insider ownership
in both countries is very close to zero; (iii) there is perfect alignment of interests
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between the insider and the outsider, in the sense that the insider uses a weighted
average of discount factors of the firm’s owners to value the stream of dividends.
1.4.4 Numerical solutions of the general model
This section solves the model numerically for two reasons. First, one needs so-
lutions to the optimal time-paths for non-portfolio variables in order to verify the
intuition provided in the previous section. Second, the time-invariant portfolio rule
derived in the previous section works only under the assumption of log utility, Cobb-
Douglas aggregation, and symmetric countries. The simple algebra used to solve for
portfolios rests entirely on the linear structure that comes out of the logarithmic util-
ity and Cobb-Douglas final goods aggregation. It is of interest whether the result of
Proposition 1 is robust to more general specifications of utility and technology. Also,
solving for portfolio positions when the countries are asymmetric is especially crucial,
because the motivation of the paper is the observed heterogeneity of institutions in
different countries. For the numerical solution, the insider and outsider both have
power utility, which nests logarithmic utility as a special case when the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution, and co-efficient of risk aversion are both 1;21 the final
good is made using Armington technology; also, the countries are asymmetric, in
that the level of insider holdings (α), and the quality of institutions (η) are allowed
to be different.
Following perturbation techniques, I find second order Taylor-series approxima-
tions of the optimal decision rules for the control variables, and the transition equa-
tions of the endogenous state variables using the algorithms provided in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004). The details of this method are reviewed in section (A.4.2).
I follow Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and Tille and Wincoop (2008) in choosing,
for the non-portfolio variables, the non-stochastic steady-state of the model as the
21Though these two parameters arguably have very different implications for portfolio allocation,
I do not attempt to differentiate between them using Epstein-Zin utility.
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approximation point. As is well known, portfolio shares are indeterminate in the
steady-state. Thus, after the first step of choosing the approximation point for non-
portfolio variables, I approximate the dynamics of the model at different guesses for
the portfolio shares. In the next step I use certain criterion to choose between the
different approximation points for portfolio shares to come up with the steady-state
portfolio value. As detailed in Judd and Guu (2001) and Devereux and Sutherland
(2007), this amounts to finding a bifurcation point (see Judd (1998), Judd and Guu
(2001)), which is the intersection of the set of stochastic and non-stochastic solutions
of the model. The details of this procedure is described in section (1.4.4.1).
1.4.4.1 Choosing the portfolio approximation point
As discussed in recent papers like Devereux and Sutherland (2006, 2007) and
Tille and Wincoop (2008), solving portfolio-choice DSGE using local approximation
techniques is problematic because the portfolio choice problem is irrelevant in the non-
stochastic steady-state, which is the approximation point used in such an approach.
Without uncertainty it does not really matter which agent owns which stream of
dividends, as long as their budget constraints hold. For example, if the countries
are symmetric and thus are equally wealthy ex-ante, any mirror-image asset holdings
can be used to support the steady-state levels of consumption in each country. As
a result, portfolio shares are indeterminate at the determinate steady-state for other
non-portfolio variables like capital stock and consumption. Thus, we need to pick out
the true steady-state portfolios of a stochastic economy from the infinite possibilities
that arise in the non-stochastic economy.
To do this, I simulate the economy around all points in a fine grid of steady
state portfolio allocations. I store the data generated from these simulations and
use certain criterion to pick the correct approximation point. First of all, recall
that markets are effectively complete for the outsider. This means that there exists
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equilibrium portfolio shares such that the Backus and Smith (1993) full risk-sharing
condition holds between outsiders of the two countries. For example, with power
utility, it must be that at the neighborhood of the true equilibrium
γĉ = ê+ γĉ∗
where γ, ĉ, ê, and ĉ∗ are the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and log-deviations
from an approximation point, of Northern outsider consumption, the real exchange
rate, and Southern outsider consumption respectively. I search for that point for
which the squared approximation error (S.E.) for this condition, up to a second order
approximation, is the least. In essence, this is the numerical counterpart of solv-
ing for an equilibrium using the first order conditions of a planner’s problem. Let
ε̂ = γĉ − ê − γĉ∗. I choose the steady state λs to minimize
S.E.ε̂ = (ε̂− ¯̂ε)
′
(ε̂− ¯̂ε)
In the general model of this section, portfolio allocations are not time-invariant, as
in the simplified version of the model in the previous section. Once we have the
correct approximation point, which by definition will be the average portfolio holding
if the model is simulated around that point, I use the decision rules to simulate a
distribution of asset holdings. To test the accuracy of this method, I follow Heathcote
and Perri (2009) in comparing the numerically derived choice of steady-state portfolios
for symmetric countries, to the analytical solution derived in Proposition 1 in section
1.4.2. This provides a robustness check for the method used.
1.4.5 Robustness checks: simulations of the general model
Simulations confirm that Proposition 1 carries through to the general case. In the
following simulation, I fix the quality of institutions in one country (North) to very
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high levels (high η), and vary η for the other country (South). When I select the
portfolio steady-state using the method described in the previous section, outsider
portfolios are home-biased, and the degree of bias goes down with better institutional
quality. The following table gives some simulated average values of portfolios for
the two countries differing in the quality of institutions in the South, for a fixed
level of insider ownership in each country (α = 0.01, α∗ = 0.5), and perfect quality
institutions in the North. The numbers for insider ownership are chosen in this
simulation so that one can easily see that the portfolio positions add up to 0.99 in
the North and 0.5 in the South.
Table 1.1: Average portfolios with different institutions in the South
Value of η∗ λNN λSN λNS λSS
10 0.9738 0.0162 0.0628 0.4372
20 0.9074 0.0826 0.1313 0.3687
100 0.8531 0.1369 0.1479 0.3521
1010 0.84 0.15 0.15 0.35
Going down column 1 of the table, as we increase the value of the institutional
quality parameter, outsider portfolios become less home-biased. These numbers can
be given a cross sectional interpretation. As we move down the column for λSN ,
we see that countries with better institutional quality will hold more international
assets. Likewise, moving down the column for λNS, we see that such countries with
should also be associated with higher levels of international liabilities. This pattern
corresponds closely with the stylized facts noted before.
1.4.6 How well does the model explain the cross sectional dispersion of
home bias?
The purpose of these exercises is to see if the model can come close to replicating
the data. I use the group of 43 countries for which stylized patterns were presented
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earlier. I try to see if the model can replicate the degree of home bias in equity
assets. First, regressions confirm that trade openness and institutions are the two
most important cross-sectional determinants of international diversification for this
group, as predicted by the model. Qualitatively speaking, the model predicts (from
Proposition 1) the correct sign of the regression coefficients – that countries more
open to trade and with better domestic institutional quality will hold more foreign
assets as a fraction of their wealth.
The numerical exercise proceeds as follows. I take one country (North) and set
insider ownership there to be equal to the value for the US (12.35%) reported in Kho
et al 2006. This is the lowest value of insider ownership in the sample. In terms of the
model, α=0.1235. I set institutional quality in this country to be perfect, i.e., η is set
to an arbitrarily large value. For the other country (South), I fix insider ownership
to the median insider ownership in the sample (48.45%). In terms of the model, this
means α∗ = 0.4845. Then I vary the quality of institutions (the parameter η∗) to
match different deciles of private benefits of control as a fraction of firm value in the
South using estimates from Dyck and Zingales (2006). For each value of η∗, I solve
for the equilibrium fraction of wealth held in domestic and foreign assets for each of
the two countries. This gives me 10 points. At one end are two symmetric countries
with perfect institutions and the foreign asset holdings of any one of them (because
they are symmetric). At the other end is one country with perfect institutions and
another with private benefits in the 10th decile, and there are 8 more such points in
between.
Figure 4 plots the results. I regress diversification on a set of controls other than
institutional quality, and take the residuals of that regression as the data points I am
trying to explain. In that case, a model without the corporate governance friction,
trivially, would not be able to explain any of this variation, while the present model
explains the cross-sectional dispersion of home bias.
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Figure 1.4: Model versus data. Each dot represents the residuals from a regression of
average (1996-2004) diversification for each country on control variables
other than institutional quality. Institutional quality on x-axis. Thus, the
scatter plot shows the partial correlation in the data between portfolios
and institutional quality. The line shown is that fitted by OLS to data
generated from the model.
1.4.6.1 The cross-sectional dispersion of investment volatility
The model also has clear predictions about the cross sectional variation of the
second moments of some observable macroeconomic aggregates. For example it pre-
dicts that the amplitude of investment fluctuations from peak to trough should go
down with better institutions. Figure 5 is a scatter plot of the standard deviation of
the growth rate of fixed capital formation versus institutional quality. A regression
with the usual controls used in this paper indicate institutions as the only signifi-
cant variable. The years used are 1996-2004. A longer time sample yields the same
cross-sectional dispersion.
1.5 Endogenous insider ownership
This section extends the model in the previous sections by letting insiders choose
their portfolios. In order to maintain tractability, I make the simplifying assumption
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Figure 1.5: Investment volatility goes down with stronger institutions. Each dot
represents the standard deviation (1996-2004) of fixed capital formation
growth rate for a country. Institutional quality measured by the Kauf-
mann et al. (2008) indices on the x-axis.
that the insider trades her shares only once during the horizon of the model. This is a
reasonable simplification in the light of two empirical observations: Kho et al. (2006)
note that the time series for average insider ownership around the world shows little
variation, the reasons for which will be clear in the discussion at the end this section;
also, there is ample evidence that insiders face large fixed costs of trading in their
control blocks because of several factors such as asymmetric information between
insiders and the market (Goldstein and Razin (2006)), price impacts of large share
sales because of negatively sloped demand curve for assets (Shleifer (1986), Chari and
Henry (2004)), and the presence of private benefits of control (Nenova (2003), Dyck
and Zingales (2006)). Thus, starting at some level of insider ownership, α0 at t = 0,
insiders trade in shares of country portfolios, and this fixes insider ownership α for
the rest of time, as in the previous sections. When making this decision, insiders take
the optimal reaction function of all other agents from time t = 0 onwards as given.
Models such as Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show that better investor protection
leads to more diffuse ownership of assets in a static, risk-neutral framework. When
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firms are equity financed, better investor protection and corporate governance increase
the amount of pledgable income for outside investors, increasing the availability of
external financing. The intuition as to why better institutional quality leads to lower
insider ownership in a dynamic model is quite simple. There are two forces at work.
The first is a risk-averse insider’s desire to diversify internationally by lowering her
ownership. However, poor institutional quality prevents insider from diversifying their
positions in the domestic index, because lower ownership increases their incentives
to extract private benefits of control. This reduces the value of the domestic index
for outsiders. Outside investors take this into account, and hence any attempt to
reduce ownership leads to downward revisions of stock prices, and hence, the value of
the insider’s holdings. This imposes a “transaction” tax on portfolio adjustments by
insiders in markets with poor institutional quality.22 The level of country insider
ownership is determined when these two forces, the diversification benefit of the
insider, and the penalty for reducing her stake, balance out.23
1.5.1 Algorithm for computing insider ownership
Recall from previous sections that I have in place a method for computing stock
prices and the portfolio allocation of outsiders, given a certain level of insider holdings.
Now, I start with a certain level of Southern insider holdings in the two risky securities,
Northern and Southern equity. Let this be (0, α∗
′
) initially, so that the Southern
insider holds equity only in the South. I assume that the North has perfect institutions
and fixed low insider ownership. Let there be an additional period t = −1 just prior
to t = 0. In this period, only the Southern insider chooses her holdings of the two
risky securities, Northern and Southern equity. She trades the securities at prices
22This effect has been analyzed in the finance literature by Admati et al. (1994) and DeMarzo
and Fishman (2007).
23Note that the insider takes into consideration the impact of her sale of shares on the price of
these shares when deciding how much to sell. Thus the insider does not act as a price taker as in
perfectly competitive markets.
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Figure 1.6: Optimal insider ownership goes down with better institutions. Each dot
represents the average utility of the Southern insider when the model
is simulated for 1000 periods at each level of insider ownership. The
negatively sloped line is for weak institutional quality.
(P (α), P ∗(α∗)), where α∗ is the final holdings of Southern equity of the Southern
insider. Note that because the insider is unable to commit to a certain level of the
value-reducing action because of imperfect corporate control, the stock price depends
on the final holdings of the insider, α∗, rather than the initial holdings α∗
′
, as in
Admati et al. (1994) and DeMarzo and Urošević (2006).
The time-line is as follows. In period t = −1, the Southern insiders announces
desired holdings α∗ for time t = 0 to ∞. Enforceable contracts are written be-
tween the Southern insider, and outsiders in each country, that the insider will sell
(α∗
′ − α∗) units of Southern stock and will receive a share of the Northern stock






units of the Northern stock index are delivered to the
Southern insider. Also, trade takes place between outsiders and portfolio holdings
{λNN , λSN , λNS, λSS} are established. The insider takes into account the effect her fi-
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nal holding has on the stock price, and consequently, her wealth, when she announces





I describe the numerical algorithm used to evaluate the best α∗ in A.4.4. In short, I
evaluate the discounted lifetime utility of insiders for various insider ownership stakes.
Figure 6 plots the result. The downward sloping line (simulation 1) shows South-
ern insider utility for various levels of insider ownership when institutions are weak.
Since the stock price falls when the post-trade equity held by the insider goes down,
there is a fall in the insider’s wealth. As a result, she gets very few Northern stocks
in exchange for her stake. Thus, though she retains private benefits of control, her
lifetime utility falls because her total dividend income falls. The insider has no incen-
tive to diversify because weak institutional quality acts as an endogenous “transaction
tax” on her portfolio adjustments. The other line (simulation 2) shows average insider
utility for various levels of insider holdings when institutional quality is perfect. Note
that there is a slight gain from diversification and there exists an optimal amount of
diversification for the insider when Southern institutions are strong. Thus, ownership
tends to remain concentrated in the South as long as institutions are weak. Also,
this yields the feature that we see in the data (see also LaPorta et al. (1999)), that
countries with weaker institutions have more insider ownership.
1.6 Conclusion
I analyze the international portfolio diversification problem of small, security-only
investors in the presence of insider ownership, corporate governance frictions, and
non-diversifiable labor income risk. The main message of the paper is that imperfect
corporate governance influences the dynamics of investment in ways that makes equity
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in domestic firms a better hedge against fluctuations in labor income for residents in a
country with poor institutions. This creates a preference for home assets in countries
with poor institutions, a cross-sectional prediction that is consistent with empirical
evidence presented in the paper. I also solve the model numerically for the optimal
amount of insider equity, and demonstrate the link between insider and outsider
portfolios in general equilibrium.
Common sense tells us that domestic equity capital should flee from countries
that have weaker institutions. This idea is captured by the model as an increase in
the volatility of dividends in a country with weaker institutions. However, how much
wealth is allocated to an asset depends not only on the relative variance of its payoff
but also on the covariance of this payoff with other sources of risk – herein lies the key
insight of the paper. Contrary to intuition, I find that domestic outside investors in
countries with weaker institutions will hold more of their own country’s float portfolio
because it has weaker institutions.
Though most of the stock of international assets is held by a handful of coun-
tries with similar, well-developed capital markets, nations where investor rights are
relatively weak are playing an increasingly important role in international capital
movements. Understanding how agency problems affect macroeconomic aggregates
and portfolio allocation thus constitutes an important set of open questions which
this paper tries to address. An extension of the work in this paper would seek to pro-
vide a fully dynamic framework which yields sharper quantitative predictions about
the degree of insider ownership, and the exact magnitudes of foreign diversification
of countries under different institutional quality. Such an extension would be better
able to address questions about the time-path of asset portfolios after financial liber-
alization and institutional reforms. These issues, and a more complete empirical test
of the mechanism by which the model generates home bias is left for future work.
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CHAPTER II
Fire-Sale FDI or Business as Usual?
2.1 Introduction
”...it happens because those with enterprize haven’t the money, and those with
money haven’t the enterprize, to buy stocks when they are cheap.” — Benjamin Gra-
ham (“Should Rich but Losing Corporations Be Liquidated?”, Forbes Magazine, 1932)
Financial crises characterized by capital flow reversals and a shortage of liquidity
for the private sector have been recurrent phenomena in modern financial markets
(Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998, 2000); Kaminsky et al. (2003)). During such episodes,
leveraged firms in affected countries find themselves unable to make payments on
short-term debt due to concurrent macroeconomic decline, or fail to convince finan-
cial markets to roll their debt over. Hence, they are forced to sell assets that they
normally would not part with, issue new financial claims that might dilute the value
of existing ones, or declare bankruptcy altogether to tide over a short-term liquidity
crunch or lack of market confidence. In these circumstances, domestic firms that are
not liquidity-constrained, and foreign firms which have access to their own capital
markets, internal or external, buy these assets. This leads to a reallocation of own-
ership in countries affected by crises. A prominent example is the Asian financial
crisis of 1997-1998, during which there was a surge of FDI in the form of MA in the
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countries affected by the crisis (Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), Acharya et al. (2007))
because domestic firms were severely liquidity-constrained.1
Though the macroeconomic causes and effects of such crises themselves have been
extensively studied, the ownership reallocations of productive assets that result are
not very well understood. This is a serious shortcoming, because it is not obvious
that markets necessarily allocate assets to their best possible users at times when
liquidity is lacking and there exist other market imperfections.
This paper uses panel data on a group of emerging market divestitures compiled
from the SDC MA database to investigate this question. First, we establish some
stylized facts about MA in a group of countries that were affected by the 1997-1998
financial crisis. We find that the number of transactions in the MA market involving
foreign buyers increased sharply during the time of the crisis, and more transactions
took place in which the acquiring firm was from the financial sector or from a sector
different than the target.2 We then evaluate the reallocations of ownership in the
period of crisis by a single metric – the evolution of the divestiture probability after
an acquisition.3 We look at the fate of acquisitions by tracking them across time to see
if the probability of divestment was significantly different for acquisitions completed
during the crisis period, and if survival rates were different for foreign versus domestic
acquisitions. We find evidence that the survival-times of foreign acquisitions in crisis-
hit countries (versus countries less affected by the crisis) were shorter than domestic
ones, and that pairings between firms from different SIC sectors, and acquisitions by
1The Asian financial crisis is said to have started on July 2nd 1997, when Thailand, sitting on
an explosively large stock of foreign-currency-denominated debt, let the Baht float. Subsequent
depreciation of the currency led Japanese commercial banks to start withdrawing from Thailand,
and later Korea. This in turn led European banks to pull out, dragging Indonesian and Malaysian
firms into similar liquidity crises.
2Often, targets have assets that are better re-deployed by local acquiring firms, for instance retail
banking (Acharya et al. (2008, 2009)). That most sectors saw more foreign investment than usual
can thus be interpreted as a reduction in the average match quality between acquiring and target
firms.
3The efficiency and success of acquisitions have been judged in the literature using data on
divestitures, see for example Kaplan and Weisbach (1992).
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foreign financial firms were less likely to last if conducted during the crisis.
Motivated by these patterns, we then build a stylized model of the MA process
where an acquiring firm searches for a target. As in the classic Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides job search framework, the transaction price is not the only determinant of
whether a match occurs. In addition, there exists a congestion externality by which
the ease of search for either party depends on the aggregate state of the market.
In our model, a financial crisis is framed as an unanticipated decline in the bar-
gaining position of target firms vis-à-vis acquiring firms. Thus, a crisis leads to two
effects. First, it depresses asset prices of target firms.4 Second, it increases the at-
tractiveness of searching for the average acquiring firm because it can get a better
deal when asset prices are lower. As a result, more acquiring firms search for tar-
gets. This externality makes it easier for the average target firm to find a match.
This lowers the average “quality” of the match between acquiring firms and target
firms in the sense that more matches take place that would not have occurred when
macroeconomic conditions were better. This endogenously leads to a faster rate of
dissolution of such matches when macroeconomic conditions rebound and the conges-
tion externality abates. These predictions of the model are consistent with the facts
noted before on MA conducted during the Asian crisis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the existing literature
in section 2.2 and present some stylized facts about MA during the Asian crisis in
section 2.3. We then build a simple model of MA in section 2.4 and relate it to our
stylized facts in section 2.5. Section 2.6 discusses our results and concludes.
4This leads to lowered collateral value, which might trigger a new spiral of fire sales. This creates
a novel mechanism by which financial shocks are amplified.
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2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 What do we know about so-called fire-sale FDI?
Academic interest in the topic of fire-sale FDI in East Asia during the crisis period
of 1997-1998 originated in a contemporary piece by Paul Krugman.5 Krugman (2000)
cited anecdotal evidence that assets in the crisis countries sold at sub-par prices
because of the liquidity crunch faced by these economies, large quantities of short
term debt being recalled at the same time as local currencies were plummeting. Since
this was a macroeconomic credit event, the victims of fire-sales were not only firms in
the financial sector, but also in other sectors like manufacturing. Krugman’s article,
along with others such as Loungani and Razin (2001) and Mody and Negishi (2001),
raised several interesting welfare and policy related questions, such as the possibility of
over-investment by foreign firms due the circumstances of a fire-sale, and the relative
desirability of FDI over other forms of capital flows such as equity investments and
debt.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) is one of the few papers which investigates the issue
of fire-sales in more detail. They find that the number of foreign MA increased by 91%
in the period leading up to and after the liquidity crisis in Asia, the years 1996-98; at
the same time domestic deals fell by 27%. The probability of a firm being acquired is
found to be a deceasing function of the firm’s liquidity position, while the offer price
to book value ratio turns out to be an increasing function of firm liquidity, suggesting
distress sales. The two above liquidity effects were prominent in 1998 only, suggesting
that aggregate liquidity was a determinant in these sales. As a robustness check they
also look at similar deals in Singapore and Taiwan, which escaped the crisis, and find
that liquidity effects were not important. Acharya et al. (2007) looking at FDI in
the financial sector of the crisis-hit countries find that the increased FDI flows were
5Pulvino (1998) examines asset fire-sales for the aircraft industry in the United States, and
confirms the common wisdom that such asset sales do occur on a systematic basis.
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associated with acquisition of majority stakes, which favors an agency-theoretic view
of FDI, that it lowers agency costs between investors and entrepreneur-managers by
transferring control rights to the investor ; and they find evidence of some of these
asset sales being reversed subsequently. Specifically, they find that flips are more
common among foreign acquisitions than domestic ones, and the party to which the
flip is sold off is more often domestic.6
However, a number of criticisms of the fire-sale view of the FDI surge in Asia can
be made. One of the simplest observable results of a fire-sale acquisition should be
large abnormal returns for the acquiring firm. However, Chari et al. (2007), using
a wider range of countries and a longer time period, and employing an event-study
methodology, find that developed market acquiring firms experienced significant pos-
itive abnormal returns to emerging market acquisitions. This is at odds with the
consensus in the developed market MA literature, that acquisitions on aggregate de-
stroy value for shareholders. They find that this result is robust across time periods
and not dependent on the presence of a crisis in the target country.7 Thus, the fact
that acquisition returns are not strongly dependent on the time period calls the fire-
sale view of crisis-period FDI into question. Interestingly, Jensen (2005) and Shleifer
and Vishny (2003) note that the end of the 90s was a boom time for mergers and ac-
quisitions. Moeller et al. (2005) find that in the period 1998 through 2001 in the US,
$1,992 billion was spent on acquisitions, which was four time what was spent from
6Their underlying theoretical argument is that such flips are in the very nature of crisis-time
FDI because foreign acquisitions take place during a liquidity crisis which normally would not have:
domestic firms would have outbid foreign firms at normal times, being more natural users of domestic
assets.
7In a regression of acquiring-firm abnormal returns on a crisis dummy which takes a value of 1
if the announcement date of the deal was either 3 months before or 9 months after the onset of a
currency crisis in a particular country, they find the coefficient on the dummy to be insignificant.
They favor a cost of capital view of the high abnormal returns they find. Their regression of returns
on sovereign bond spreads, which are a proxy for the cost of financing projects in emerging markets
faced by emerging market firms, gives a positive coefficient, suggesting that the larger the differential
between the cost of capital of the developed market acquiring-firm and its target, the higher the
gains anticipated by the stock market from the merger. However, in similar regressions with dollar
value gain as the dependent variable the bond spread coefficients are not significant.
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1980 through 1990, and these four years also saw a doubling in the number of MA.
Thus the surge of FDI into emerging markets documented in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2005) and Acharya et al. (2007) may have been part of a larger worldwide trend.
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the crisis period were also a period of
radical deregulation to ownership rules in the crisis-stricken countries in response to
IMF strictures. Andrade et al. (2001) while noting the overwhelming importance of
deregulation in driving industry-level MA activity cite the example of the 90s merger
wave in the US. The financial sector in the crisis countries were among the first to
be opened up to foreign ownership. It would not be surprising if this led to a surge
of large investments in this industry, as documented by Acharya et al. (2007). Since
a very large number of MA transactions occurred outside this sector, it would be
worthwhile to know if flipping is omnipresent, or a peculiarity of the financial sector.
This might be the case because of the presence of private equity firms which specialize
in taking over a troubled concern, implementing value improving changes to it, and
then selling it back at a profit to a more natural user of the asset, for instance a firm
in the same industry. Thus, it would be interesting to learn if indeed the surge of
FDI, and the associated flipping, was fire-sale FDI or business-as-usual.
2.2.2 What do we know about the longevity of foreign acquisitions?
The extensive literature on divestitures has examined the causes, longevity and
valuation effects of divestitures, both foreign and domestic. Theoretical research
on divestiture has generally adopted performance, agency theory and asymmetric
information perspectives, suggesting that the divestiture decision is determined by
economic performance, governance effectiveness and the desire to improve firm market
value by mitigating the valuation problems associated with diversified firms.
A number of papers, for example Bergh (1997), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1991), show that a large proportion of acquired businesses
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is later divested. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) studies a sample of large domes-
tic acquisitions completed in the US between 1971 and 1982. By the end of 1989,
acquiring-firms had divested almost 44 percent of the target companies. Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1991) cites five common reasons that have been quoted in the literature
as a cause of divestitures. These are, sub-par performance of divested units, financial
difficulties faced by the divesting firm, lack of strategic fit between lines of business,
low managerial attachment to the divested unit, and difficulties with the divested unit
that had their roots in a previous merger. On a more aggregate level, learning and
externalities have also been found to play a role. For example, Shaver et al. (1997)
argue that foreign firms operating in a host country generate information spill-overs
that have potential value for later FDI. They look at 354 U.S. investments undertaken
by foreign firms in manufacturing industries during 1987 and track their survival to
1992. They find FDIs by firms with experience in a host country to be more likely to
survive than investments made by first-time entrant, and greater survival chances the
greater the foreign presence in the target industry at the time of investment, subject
to two contingencies. The first contingency being that the relationship is weak or
nonexistent among firms with no experience in the host country, probably because
these firms have difficulty evaluating and taking advantage of the information spill-
overs; the second, that the presence of other foreign firms does not affect investment
survival among firms that already have a presence in the target industry and under-
take expansion, presumably because they already possess general information about
the target industries and are unlikely to gain additional benefit from information
spill-overs. One of the few studies looking at emerging market divestitures is Holan
and Toulan (2006) who look at divestitures by foreign companies in Argentina in the
period 1990-2002. They find that macroeconomic factors as well as the structure of
the original deal affect the longevity of the acquisition. To the best of our knowledge,
our study will be the first to evaluate emerging market divestitures in a large set of
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countries.
2.3 Some empirical facts
In this section we present some empirical facts regarding MA activity in a group
of Asian countries during the period 1990-2008. The aim is to illustrate certain
distinctive characteristics of FDI in the countries that were affected most by the crisis
of 1997-1998. The following sections describe the data, the econometric techniques
employed, and our main findings.
2.3.1 The data
We study the subset of firms that were involved in MA transactions in emerging
economies in the period January 1990 to March 2009. Our data is collected from
the SDC emerging market MA database.8 Out of these, we identify firms that are
mentioned as targets of MA more than once during the period in question. If a
target is not mentioned multiple times in our data, it could mean three things: it
never became a target again; it could not become a target again because at some
subsequent point in time, it went out of business; it was reorganized by the first
buyer under a different name and thus does not show up as a target under the same
name. Firms that were not acquired during our sample period obviously do not enter
the data, but might have been targets at some previous date. On the seller side,
each listed acquisition in SDC could have been completed by a purchase of blocks
from one or more sellers, or by stock-market purchases, or conversions of debt to
equity by a financial institution. On the buyer side, most of the transactions involved
a single buyer, though there are cases where the same firm is listed as a target on
8Cross-border mergers occur when the assets and operation of firms from different countries are
combined to establish a new legal identity, and cross-border acquisitions occur when the control of
assets and operations is transferred from a local to a foreign company, with the former becoming an
affiliate of the latter.
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the same date multiple times, which indicates that multiple buyers were involved.
This distinction is important in certain parts of the analysis, and will be addressed
in a later section. SDC also lists the identity of the acquiring and target party, and
various other deal characteristics, for example the percentage of the firm owned after
the transaction is completed by the acquiring party, the dollar value of the deal, the
industry characteristics of the target and acquiring firm, and so on. 9
2.3.2 Patterns of Asian MA during 1990-2008
This section provides an aggregate view of the developments in the market for
corporate control in Asia during the years 1990-2008. Our analysis covers eleven Asian
countries: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. We focus on the evolution of the
total number of MA transactions in these countries and three broad categories that
are relevant to our story: transactions involving foreign buyers, those involving the
financial sector, and those involving firms in the same one digit SIC industry.
Diagram (1) in appendix B.1 shows, for the eleven countries over the period 1990
to 2008, the total number of MA transactions and the numbers in three categories
(foreign acquiring firm, financial acquiring firm, same SIC digit acquisitions). Dia-
gram (2) shows the same information as percentages of total transactions. The total
number of transactions as well as the numbers in each of the three categories trended
upwards during the entire period. However, the percentage of transactions involving
foreign buyers declined over this period.
We then classify the countries in our analysis into “high”, “medium”, and “low”
crisis countries based on the economic indices reported in Goldstein (1998). Our
9Where SDC does not list the parties involved in the transaction, we find financial-press articles
from Dow Jones Factiva indicating who the sellers were in each of these acquisitions, wherever
available. So for the (large) subset of acquisitions which were a result of divestitures by a seller,
and whenever there is data, we find the identity of the divesting party. A concern with this method
is that deals which receive press coverage might have characteristics systematically different from
deals which do not.
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“high” crisis countries are Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand, the “middle” crisis
countries are Hong Kong, Malaysia and Philippines, while our “low” crisis countries
are China, India, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The foreign versus domestic
acquiring firm components of the total transactions shows an interesting pattern which
is captured by the correlation table below. In the “high” crisis group, the correlation
between the number of foreign transactions and (a) the total number transactions, (b)
the number of domestic transactions, is much lower than in the other two groups of
countries. This is driven by the fact that though the number of foreign and domestic
transactions by and large moved together in the sample, they moved in opposite
directions after 1998 in two of the “high” crisis countries, Thailand and South Korea.
The correlations between the number of domestic and foreign transactions before and
after 1998 for South Korea and Thailand changed sign from 0.8787 and 0.6101 to
-0.4611 and -0.7232 respectively.10 In the years after 1998 the number of transactions
involving foreign buyers declined, offset by an increase in the number of transactions
involving domestic buyers. This provides evidence suggestive of the kind of “flipping”
noted in Acharya et al. (2009) and lends credence to a fire sale view of FDI during
the crisis, especially in Thailand and South Korea. To explore this phenomenon more
thoroughly, we next turn to an analysis of the longevity of mergers conducted during
the crisis.
2.3.3 Stylized facts about longevity
2.3.3.1 Motivation for hazard analysis
The econometric technique that we employ for our analysis is hazard or survival
analysis. Survival analysis encompasses a set of risk-estimation techniques, originally
developed for and employed in the analysis of event times in manufacturing processes
and patient histories in medical trails, that are particularly suitable to the data and
10Only one other country, Taiwan, shows this pattern of “flipping” post-1998.
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Foreign (crisis) Domestic (crisis)
Total (crisis) 0.5158 0.9675
Foreign (crisis) 1 0.2823





Table 2.1: Correlation between number of total, foreign, and domestic transactions
(1990-2008)
question we have in mind. Simpler techniques, such as dummy variable analysis
of events such as acquisitions have shortcomings because of their assumptions of a
Gaussian error term in the data generating process. Consider the simple linear model,
tj = β0 + β
′
xj + εj, εj ∼ N(0, σ2)
where tj is the time between a pair of acquisitions for target j, and xj is vector of
explanatory variables. This model assumes that
tj
∣∣xj ∼ N(β0 + β ′xj, σ2)
whereas, event-times rarely follow the normal distribution, and are typically non-
symmetric and even bi-modal. This non-normality of the distribution of event times
is the primary motivation for using hazard analysis.
2.3.3.2 Structuring the data
Recall that the purpose of the study is to find whether acquisitions during crises
are different, and whether there are further differences between groups such as trans-
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actions involving domestic versus foreign acquiring firms, or same-industry versus
different-industry pairings of target and acquiring firm. Unfortunately, in most cases
SDC does not provide us with the identity of the seller in a transaction. Thus it is
not possible, using the SDC data alone, to look at specific target-acquiring firm rela-
tionships, and track the time to their dissolution, because this would involve knowing
the divesting party in each transaction. So we choose to look at whether times be-
tween subsequent acquisitions on average were any different for the subset of firms
that were acquired during crises. This does not require knowing the identity of the
divesting firm in each transaction. The definitions of the ‘subject’ that experiences
the hazard of the event, the ‘failure-event’ itself, and the corresponding ‘failure-time’
depend on this distinction. We implicitly purport that firms that become targets
during crises (rather than crisis-time acquisitions) are different in some way, and that
this difference would show up starkly in an analysis that focusses on the experience of
the targets over time. In this case, our subject is an isolated target firm, the failure
event for a subject is simply a transaction involving that subject as a target, and
the data is characterized by possible multiple events associated with the same firm,
because the same firm might become a target multiple times.11
Although this approach admittedly simplifies the reality of the MA process, we can
get a surprising amount of insight from this analysis. For example, we can correlate
the average longevity of deals with certain observed characteristics of the transaction,
like whether pairings between firms where the buyer was foreign firm were less likely
to last on average. We also conduct robustness tests by conducting our analysis
for different subsets of firms in which different ownership stakes were acquired. For
instance, in cases where a target firm was fully acquired, there is no doubt as to the
identity of the seller in the subsequent transaction involving the same target.
11Because we cannot assume that event times are uncorrelated for the same firm, we cannot treat
each event date as coming from a separate subject under study. Hence, our estimators and statistical
tests have to take into account the possibility of this serial correlation.
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2.3.3.3 Notation
We define ‘failure’ involving firm j simply as a transaction in which firm j was a
target. The starting time for the risk of failure is defined to be the moment at which
the previous MA transaction between j, and any acquiring firm, is completed. Then
Tj, the failure-time, is just the duration of time which elapses between two consecutive
transactions involving firm j as target. F , the cumulative density, S, the survivor
function, f , the probability density, and h, the hazard function are then simply,
F (tj) = Pr(Tj ≤ tj) (2.1)







= −S ′(tj) (2.3)
h(tj) = lim
∆tj→0




The hazard function h(tj) then gives us the probability that firm j will experience
an acquisition event in the interval of time ∆tj, conditional on the fact that it has
not been the target of an acquisition for tj units of time since the last acquisition was
completed. This hazard function captures the risk of a typical member of the popula-
tion being acquired t days after its last acquisition. Under the plausible assumption
that most acquisitions on the buyer side involve a divestiture on the seller side, this
hazard is also a good measure of the typical frequency of divesture for the average
firm.
2.3.3.4 Semi-parametric Cox model
We pool the survival time data from the eleven Asian countries and analyze it
using the Cox proportional hazards model (see Cleves et al. (2008)). The Cox model
is semi-parametric. The key assumption is that hazard rates are proportional to
55
some baseline hazard across different patterns of explanatory variables. While the
model assumes no parametric form for the the baseline hazard, it posits a functional
relationship between hazards for different explanatory variables. Let the h(t) be the
hazard function as defined before. Then the Cox model can be written as
h(t|X) = h0(t)eX
′β (2.5)
where h0 is the baseline hazard and X is a vector of explanatory variables like country
fixed effects. Equivalently, the Cox model can be written as
ln[h(t|X)] = ln[h0(t)] +X ′β (2.6)
Thus the sign of the estimated coefficients of the model can be interpreted as deter-
mining the direction in which the explanatory variables shift the natural logarithm
of the baseline hazard. For example, estimating a Cox model with country dummies
and the baseline hazard of Taiwan gives positive and significant β coefficients on each
of the dummies, which can be interpreted as saying that Taiwan had the lowest di-
vestiture probability in our sample of countries at each point in time (the results are
reported in appendix B.1). The table shows that the hazard of divestiture was highest
in Philippines, followed by Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Hong Kong, India, China, Vietnam, and Taiwan.
Our main results are from a Cox model with a complete set of controls. In this re-
gression we control for (i) unobserved country characteristics using country dummies;
(ii) the acquiring firm being foreign or domestic; (iii) the acquiring firm being from
the financial or non-financial sector; (iv) the transactions being between firms in the
same sector; (v) an indicator variable for the years 1997-1998; and (vi) interaction
dummies between (i), (v), and each of (ii), (iii), and (iv).12
12An example of (vi) would be a dummy for transactions (i) in Indonesia, (v) during the 1997-1998
crisis, (ii) by foreign buyers.
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Table B.2 of appendix B.1 presents a subset of coefficients from this regression.
We report dummy coefficients for foreign acquisitions in South Korea and Singapore
as representative of two extremes of crisis severity. The table shows that hazard rates
were significantly higher in South Korea than in Singapore when the acquiring firm
was a foreign firm, and that the rate was actually lower than the baseline (Taiwan) for
foreign acquisitions overall. The complete set of coefficients (not reported) reveal that
hazard rates were significantly higher than the baseline in the “high” crisis countries
when the target and acquiring firm were from different one digit SIC sectors; and
significantly higher than the baseline for financial acquiring firms overall.
In summary, the data suggest that crisis-time pairings were less likely to last. The
facts discussed above suggest a number of possible reasons. First, crisis-time buyers
were predominantly foreign. Secondly, pairings took place where acquiring firms were
from the financial sector and were thus less likely to hold a controlling interest for
very long. A third reason is that pairings between firms from different industries
increased during the crisis. The data also indicates that being acquired by a foreign
firm during in the countries with a severe crisis meant that you were more likely to be
sold later on, and possibly “flipped” to a domestic buyer. Motivated by these broad
stylized facts, we build a simple model of MA in the following section.
2.3.3.5 Robustness checks
Three robustness checks are conducted to check the above results. First, we check
if the results hold for the small subset of transactions that involved a complete (100%)
transfer of control. Due to the consequent large reduction in sample size, we replace
the individual country dummies in the previous analysis with a dummy for “high”
crisis countries (Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea). The results, reported in the
appendix, remain qualitatively unchanged.
Next, we take into account the fact that major policy changes regarding capital
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movement and foreign investment were implemented during the crisis. Most of the
literature to date has compared the pre-crisis period to the crisis-period, ignoring
these regime shifts. Hence, we exclude the pre-crisis transactions from the analysis,
comparing only the years 1997-1998 to the 1999-2008 period. Unsurprisingly, the
results (not reported) remain unchanged: since the volume of MA increased sub-
stantially after the crisis deregulations, the weight of the 1999-2008 transactions is
disproportionately high in the results of the previous section using the entire sample.
We also include transactions from a set of non-Asian countries as a control group.
These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, and
South Africa. We then repeat the analysis of the previous section. The results for
our group of Asian countries remain qualitatively unchanged. As before, selective
results are reported in the appendix contrasting South Korea and Singapore.
2.4 The model
This section presents a simple dynamic model of search and matching between
acquiring and target firms by extending the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (Diamond
(1993), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) framework of job search in the spirit of
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008). The problem is cast as a two-sided matching
problem in continuous time and follows closely the treatment in Pissarides (2000).
Even though mergers and acquisitions are each distinct activities, we abstract from
any differences and describe both of them as a matching process.
2.4.1 The environment
Firms: The model consists of a small open economy S and the rest of the world
W . There are a pool of target firms in S, numbering N . N is a large number
determined exogenously by macroeconomic conditions. Out of these NA are of type
A and NB are of type B. “Type” can be interpreted narrowly as industry, or broadly
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as any characteristic of a firm that may be relevant for the purposes of matching. The
ratio NA
NB
is exogenous. At any point in time, uN of these firms are actively looking to
sell assets, the same fraction u of each type. There are also acquiring firms, distinct
from the target firms and all of type A, that are looking to buy assets. Their number,
expressed in terms of N is vN . Out of these, vSN are from S and vWN are from




the relative proportion of domestic acquiring firms, is exogenous and determined by
macroeconomic conditions. For the moment we will assume that foreign and domestic
acquiring firms are identical in all respects except that they are labeled differently.
The number of matches taking place per unit time is given by
mN = m(uN, vN), (2.7)
which is the matching function. It is assumed to be increasing in both its arguments,
concave, and homogeneous of degree 1. The acquiring and target firms that are
matched at any point in time are randomly selected from the sets vN and uN . Hence










by the degree 1 homogeneity of the matching function.
Productivity: A firm of type A or B is a Lucas Tree whose output is zA or zB,
which also denotes the stand-alone productivity of a firm of a particular type. Firms
of each type, though clearly labeled and known to be as such, are indistinguishable by
productivity in their unmatched state. Thus zA = zB = z. Only when they match,
do their type begin to matter in a way described below. Henceforth, we will use
the general notation zA or zB with the implicit understanding that they are equal
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in value. Merger-specific (idiosyncratic) shocks to the productivity of a match arrive
at the Poisson rate λ. Once a shock arrives, an acquiring party can choose either to
continue the match with the new productivity, or terminate the match and divest. As
a simplification, we assume that the productivity of the match can take two values: it
is either high enough so that continuing the relationship is profitable, or low enough
so that divestiture results. Idiosyncratic shocks move the value of productivity from
the high level to the low one at rate λ.
The high-state productivity of a match depends on the type of the two matching
firms. Define a function zh = z(zi, zj) with i = A and j = A,B that gives the
high-state productivity of a match between acquiring firm i and target firm j. Thus,
zh(zA, zB) is the high-state productivity of the matched entity when acquiring firm of
type A and target of type B match, and zh(zA, zA) the productivity of the matched
entity when acquiring firm of type A and target of type B. Similarly, we denote the
low-state match productivity values as zl(zA, zB) and z
l(zA, zA). We assume that
zA + zB < z
h(zA, zB) < z
h(zA, zA)
zl(zA, zB) < z
l(zA, zA) < zA + zB (2.9)
The first inequality on the first line expresses the idea that MA create value if match
productivity is in the high state and the second inequality says that greater value
is created when similar types match.13 As noted before, “type” can be interpreted
quite broadly in this context. A good match may result from the combination of
complementary assets of firms in the same industry. For example, a foreign bank may
match with a domestic bank to take advantage of its existing local client base. Or,
the gains from a match may result from industry-specific expertise. The inequalities
13The first assumption is a simple way to introduce incentives for matches. It is controversial
given the large literature on the destruction of value by MA, see for example Moeller et al. (2005).
However, Chari et al. (2007) find that MA create value when targets are from emerging markets and
acquiring firms from developed markets, which is the situation we model.
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on the second line simply state that mergers destroy value in the low state, and hence
will not be undertaken in equilibrium. The value of the high-state productivity itself
is not subject to uncertainty, though it may switch to the low-state productivity by
the stochastic process described before.
Mergers/Acquisitions: MA are modeled in a simple way. A match takes place
between and acquiring and target firm when they meet and agree to merge. Once
a merger takes place, production continues at the high productivity till a negative
shock hits. At this point a divestiture occurs. The separating target and acquiring
firm rejoin the pool of unmatched target firms and acquiring firms respectively. In
addition, the acquiring firm can choose to withdraw from the market for corporate
control.
Without growth in the number of firms, the mean number of target firms which
are divested during a small time interval δt is λ(1− u)Nδt, and the mean number of
target firms which match with acquiring firms is mNδt. The latter can be rewritten
as uθq(θ)δt. The evolution of the mean number of firms that are seeking buyers is
then the difference between these two rates,
u̇ = λ(1− u)− θq(θ)u. (2.10)
In the steady state, the mean number of firms seeking acquiring firms is constant, so
λ(1− u) = θq(θ)u. (2.11)
Lemma 1 rewrites u in terms of the rate of dissolution of mergers λ and the rate of
formation of matches θq(θ).







This is the first key equation of the model. It implies that for given λ and θ, there
is a unique equilibrium number of unmatched firms. λ is a parameter of the model;
θ is an unknown. It is shown next that θ is determined by an equation derived from
the assumption of profit maximization and that it is unique and independent of u.
Acquiring firm: A match takes place when a prospective unmatched acquiring
firm and a prospective unmatched target meet and agree on the terms of the match.
Before this happens, both an acquiring firm and a target firm have to be unmatched
and searching. The contract at the time of matching specifies a distribution of the
surplus from the match. Only a pair of firms may match. As described before, the
value of the output from a match is zh(zA, zA) or z
h(zA, zB). At times when a match
has not yet taken place, the acquiring firm searches for a target at a fixed cost of
czh > 0 per unit time. During this process, targets arrive to acquiring firms at
the rate q(θ), which is independent of the actions of the acquiring firm. The search
cost is made proportional to the match productivity to capture the idea that it is
costlier to find a better match.The number of acquiring firms searching for a target is
endogenous and determined by profit maximization. Since any firm is free to search
for a target, profit maximization requires that a zero profit condition hold for the
entry of acquiring firms into the market for corporate control.
Let JAA and JAB be the present-discounted value of the expected profit to an
acquiring firm from a matched situation with target type A and B respectively; VA
is the present-discounted value of expected profit to an acquiring firm from being in
an unmatched state. With perfect capital markets, an infinite horizon and when no
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dynamic changes in parameters are expected, VA satisfies the Bellman equations
rVA = zA − czh(zA, zA) + q(θ)(JAA − V )
rVA = zA − czh(zA, zB) + q(θ)(JAB − V ) (2.13)
Since in equilibrium all profit opportunities from new matches are exploited, rents
from the state unmatched for acquiring firms is driven to zero. This gives Lemma 2.








This is the second set of key equations of the equilibrium model. For an individual
firm, 1
q(θ)
is the expected duration of being unmatched. The above conditions state
that in equilibrium, market tightness θ is such that the expected profit from a new
match is equal to the expected cost of matching. Since in the environment of the
model a firm cannot enter the market for corporate control while being matched,
there are rents in equilibrium associated with the matched state. Competition for
matching with an acquiring firm drives those rents down to the expected cost of
finding a target.
The asset value of a matched situation satisfies a value equation similar the one
for the unmatched situation. The flow capital cost of the matched situation is rJAA
or rJAB. The match yields a net return of z
h(zA, zA)−TAA or zh(zA, zB)−TAB, where
zh(zA, zA), z
h(zA, zB) are real output after matching and TAA, TAB are the shares of
the target firm in the surplus sharing arrangement specified in the contract of the
match. The match also runs a risk λ of an adverse shock which leads to the loss of
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J . Hence JAA and JAB satisfy the conditions,
rJAA = z
h(zA, zA)− TAA − λJAA
rJAB = z
h(zA, zB)− TAB − λJAB (2.15)
The acquiring firm takes the interest rate and value of the match as given, but
the surplus-sharing arrangement is determined by a bargain with the target. Using
the previous two sets of equations to eliminate r JAA we get Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. The “demand for mergers” conditions relating the surplus share of the
target to the creation of matches are given by
zh(zA, zA)− TAA −
(r + λ)(czh(zA, zA)− zA)
q(θ)
= 0
zh(zA, zB)− TAB −
(r + λ)(czh(zA, zB)− zA)
q(θ)
= 0 (2.16)
Target firm: Let UA, WA and UB, WB denote the present-discounted value of
the expected income stream of, respectively, an unmatched and matched target of
types A and B. A target enjoys (expected) real return zA or zB (recall, zA = zB = z)
when unmatched, and in unit time expects to match with probability θq(θ). Hence
UA, UB satisfy
rUA = z + θq(θ)(WA − UA)
rUB = z + θq(θ)(WB − UB). (2.17)
Matched targets get TAA or TAB depending on their type; the match gets dissolved
64
with an exogenous probability λ. Hence, WA and WB satisfy
rWA = TAA + λ(UA −WA)
rWB = TAB + λ(UB −WB). (2.18)
The previous two sets of equations yield the flow value of matched and unmatched
target firms as a weighted average of their matched and unmatched productivity z and
TAA, TAB, where the weights are a function of the discount rate r and the transition
rates λ, θq(θ).
rUA =
(r + λ)z + θq(θ)TAA
r + λ+ θq(θ)
rUB =
(r + λ)z + θq(θ)TAB
r + λ+ θq(θ)
(2.19)
rWA =
λz + (r + θq(θ))TAA
r + λ+ θq(θ)
rWB =
λz + (r + θq(θ))TAB
r + λ+ θq(θ)
(2.20)
Since TAB ≥ TAA ≥ zA = zB = z, it follows from the above four equations that
matched firms of either type have higher value than unmatched firms. Hence, being in
an unmatched state is more costly to those firms currently experiencing it than those
which expect being in that state on the future. But in the absence of discounting,
target firms in these two states are equally well off in flow value terms. The reason
is that with an infinite horizon, all target firms eventually are involved equally in
matches and divestitures, and the precise timing of the experience does not affect ex
ante returns.
Nash Bargaining: As is standard in the search literature, we assume that the
surplus sharing rules TAA and TBB are decided by the acquiring and target firms by
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Nash bargaining (Nash (1953)). Thus TAA and TBB satisfy
Tij = arg max(Wij − Uij)β(Jij − Vij)1−β i = A and j = A,B (2.21)
where 0 ≤ β ≥ 1. β captures the relative bargaining positions of the acquiring and
target firm that are a functions of factors other than the “threat points” or outside
options given by Uij and Vij
The first-order maximization conditions satisfy
Wij − Uij = β(Jij +Wij − Vij − Uij)1−β i = A and j = A,B. (2.22)
So β is the target firm’s share in the total surplus that a match creates. The standard
solutions to the Nash bargaining problem for TAA and TAB are provided in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Target firms of type A and B claim TAA and TAB of post-match output,
given by
Tij = (1− β)z + βzh(zi, zj)(1 + cθ) i = A and j = A,B. (2.23)
Intuitively, zh(zi, zj)cθ is the average cost to the acquiring firm of merging with an
unmatched target firm. Thus, targets are rewarded for the saving of the merging costs
that the representative acquiring firm gains when a merger is completed. A higher
θ indicates that acquiring firms arrive to target firms at a higher rate than targets
to acquiring firms, relative to an equilibrium with lower θ. The target’s bargaining
strength is then higher and the acquiring firm’s lower. As a result, the target ends
up with a higher Tij in the high θ equilibrium.
2.4.2 Steady-state equilibrium analysis
In this section we define and characterize the equilibrium of the model. We also
develop some tools that will be used in the next section to relate the model to the
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stylized facts.
Definition 2. An equilibrium in the model is a set (u,θ,TAA,TAB) that satisfies the
following conditions:




(2) The demand for MA conditions from Lemma 3
zh(zA, zA)− TAA −
(r + λ)(czh(zA, zA)− zA)
q(θ)
= 0
zh(zA, zB)− TAB −
(r + λ)(czh(zA, zB)− zA)
q(θ)
= 0
(3) The target surplus shares from Lemma 4
TAA = (1− β)z + βzh(zA, zA)(1 + cθ)
TAB = (1− β)z + βzh(zA, zB)(1 + cθ).
The equations from Lemmas 3 and 4 can be used to solve for the equilibrium θ,
TAA and TAB. The following figure plots the “demand for MA” curves and the “target
surplus shares” conditions. The equilibrium values of θ, TAA and TAB can be found
from their intersection. Higher match productivity leads both curves to be higher for
type A. But with β < 1, higher match productivity leads to a greater shift up of the
“demand for MA conditions” than the surplus sharing arrangement. This gives us
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Market tightness and target’s share of surplus are larger for type A
targets, i.e. TAA > TAB and θAA > θAB.
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Figure 2.1: Determination of equilibrium target shares (TAA and TAB) of surplus and
market tightness (θ)
Proof: This follows upon inspection of the expressions for the two equilibrium
conditions for each type and from β < 1.
The result is intuitive. Type A target firms have higher bargaining power because
matching with them creates greater total surplus. The value of θ = v
u
is also higher
for type A targets. This is because there are relatively more acquiring firms looking
for a match with type As than for type Bs, as well as relatively few unmatched type
As looking for matches.14 This can seen using another convenient diagrammatic tool,
the “flow equilibrium condition” from Lemma 1 and the equilibrium θ = v
u
from the
previous diagram, plotted together. The former is a negatively sloped curve on u− v
plane while the latter is a line with constant slope equal to the equilibrium θ.
2.5 Mergers and acquisitions during financial crises
This section uses the framework developed to analyze the effects of a financial
crisis, which is modeled in a very simplistic way. As noted by Aguiar and Gopinath
14In equilibrium, acquiring firm search for both types because they would rather match with any
type than not match at all.
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Figure 2.2: Determination of equilibrium fraction of unmatched targets (u) and ac-
quiring firms looking for targets (v)
(2005), the Asian financial crisis was accompanied by a sharp decline of domestic
liquidity in the affected countries. Leveraged domestic firms found themselves unable
to make payments on short-term debt or failed to convince financial markets to roll
their debt over due to worsening revenue streams. As a result, they found themselves
in an unfavorable bargaining position vis-à-vis acquiring firms to whom they were
looking to sell assets. In terms of our model, the situation is characterized below.
Definition 3. A financial crisis in the market for corporate control is an exogenous
decline in the bargaining power (β) of target firms.
An unexpected change in the model parameter β leads to a dynamic adjustment to
a new equilibrium. For the moment, we abstract from these dynamics and focus on
particular characteristics of the new steady-state with a lower β.
Proposition 4. During a financial crisis when β is lower,
(1) θ is higher for both types, v is higher for both types, and u is lower for both
types.
(2) Relatively more matches of lower match quality, i.e. between type A acquiring
firms and type B targets take place during a financial crisis.
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(3) The surplus shares, TAA, TAB, for both target types is lower.
Proof: (1) and (3) follow from the diagrams. A decline in β shifts only the
“surplus share” curves down, reduces both TAA and TAB, and increases θ for both
types. That v is higher for both types, and u is lower for both types can be seen by
tilting the equilibrium θ = v
u
line up to the new, higher θ.














which implies that when β declines, market tightness θ = v
u
increases by less for type
A firms and then for type B firms.
Corollary 1. Matches taking place during crises will dissolve with higher probability.
Proof: When the change in β is reversed, market tightness will decline by more
for the type B firms and then for type A firms. The result follows from this observa-
tion.
Thus, the model is able to qualitatively replicate the stylized facts that we started
out with: that during the “crisis” versus “other times” (low β versus high β state),
relatively more pairings between firms from different SIC sectors took place, and that
acquisitions by foreign financial firms or firms from different SIC-digit industries than
their targets were less likely to last if conducted during the crisis. Recall, that we
interpret matches between foreign and domestic firms, and firms from different SIC
sectors as lower quality matches.15 Since the A − B pairings were seen to be more
15The reasoning behind this comes from the existence of complementary or sector-specific assets.
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sensitive to changes in β than the A − A pairings, the model predicts the correct
pattern of MA activity during the crisis, and the correct pattern of divestiture post-
crisis.
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper asks if mergers and acquisitions that took place in affected countries
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 were substantively different in terms of
their survival rates. To answer this question, we construct a comprehensive survival-
time data set of MA in a group of Asian countries covering the period 1990-2008
using the Securities Data Company database. Using parametric and non-parametric
survival-analysis techniques, we find that the survival-times of foreign acquisitions
in crisis-hit countries (versus countries less affected by the crisis) were shorter than
domestic ones, and that pairings between firms from different SIC sectors, and acqui-
sitions by foreign financial firms were less likely to last if conducted during the crisis.
We also construct a simple model of mergers as a matching process between firms by
extending the classic Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework to the problem of an
acquiring firm searching for a target. The model is able to replicate some qualitative
features of the data, like the matching of unlike firms during the crisis and the early
dissolution of such mergers afterwards. The mechanism works through an increase
in the incentives of acquiring firms to search for targets due to the lower bargaining
power of the latter during financial crises, and the consequent externality for target
firms.
FDI is generally thought of as a long term capital flow that is beneficial to the
recipient country. But the recent trend of FDI completed through purchase of existing
assets by the MA process goes contrary to this view because of the relative ease of
subsequent divestiture. This paper presents some preliminary evidence that this
might be especially true for fire-sale FDI conducted during financial crises.
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The work in this paper may be enriched along several dimensions. A more com-
plete parametric investigation of survival times with firm-level independent variables
will tell us which firm characteristics determine divestures. The asset pricing impli-
cations of these divestitures could also be explored using an event-study methodology
centered around the announcement date of the acquisition and subsequent divesti-
ture. Abnormal returns in the event-window of the subset of publicly traded firms
in our sample would contain information on how financial markets price the quality
of matches taking place during crises. The simple theoretical model presented could
also be extended to include capital accumulation, endogenous determination of the
roles of target versus acquiring firm, and an explicit role of liquidity. Addressing these
questions is left for future work.
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CHAPTER III
The Aggregate Consequences of Imperfect
Institutions
3.1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between four key macroeconomic variables
and the quality of economic institutions in a country. It is shown that countries with
stronger domestic institutions (i) have smaller average firm sizes and a more posi-
tively skewed firm size distribution (FSD henceforth) overall,1 while having a higher
proportion of large firms when taking into account only the upper tail of the FSD;
(ii) exhibit lower macroeconomic volatility, measured by the standard deviation of the
growth rates of gross domestic product (GDP) and consumption; (iii) use more mar-
ket finance, measured by the number of listed companies and market capitalization
as a percentage of GDP; and (iv) have lower domestic risk premia.
Using yearly data from the WorldBank (2008), Kaufmann et al. (2008), and Chinn
and Ito (2008), we create a cross sectional data set comprising various country-level
measures of aggregate volatility, financing costs, and market finance prevalence, along
with country controls.2 We also create an industry-country panel of estimated mo-
1Positive skewness means a higher proportion of smaller firms in the FSD.
2We do not employ a panel because there is not much time variation in our primary independent
variable, institutional quality. Also, we need to make use of the time dimension of the data to
calculate our measures of aggregate volatility.
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ments and parameters of firm size distributions using annual sales and employment
data from ORBIS. Following Desai et al. (2003), we then run multivariate regressions
with country and industry controls to examine the effect of institutional quality on
our variables of interest.
Firm-level and aggregate facts are usually treated separately in the literature. For
example, Kumar et al. (1999), Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Cabral and Mata (2003),
Angelini and Generale (2008), Champonnois (2010), and Arellano et al. (2008) ex-
amine the effects of financial constraints and contract enforcement on FSD and firm
dynamics. Others, such as Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Cooley et al. (2004), and
Albuquerque and Wang (2008) point out that weak contract enforcement go hand
in hand with high aggregate volatility and intermediated financing costs. A unified
empirical treatment of aggregate volatility and FSD has been missing because indi-
vidual firms play no role traditional macroeconomics: in model economies made up
of a continuum of identical small firms, firm-level volatility does not translate into
aggregate volatility due to the law of large numbers. Yet, as discussed in Gabaix
(2005), the distribution of firm sizes is heavy-tailed in reality, with a large number of
small firms and a few very large firms. This creates a link between a country’s FSD
and its macroeconomic aggregates. Thus, factors that possibly affect FSD also have
macroeconomic consequences. The primary contribution of our paper lies in correlat-
ing some facts about aggregate risk and FSD to the same country-level measure of
institutional quality in a unified sample of countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 motivates our empirical
approach and surveys the most relevant papers. Section 3.3 and its subsections de-
scribe the data, empirical specifications, and our main results. Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Related literature and theoretical motivation
Though the primary objective of this paper is to unearth stylized facts, we are not
agnostic about the underlying mechanism which generates these facts. Specifically,
we take the view that financial frictions created by the ownership structure of firms
and weak institutional quality link all these facts together.
As noted by Champonnois (2008), FSD has been used as an ingredient in the
explanation of a number of phenomenon in economics like exporting behavior (Help-
man et al. (2004), di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)), aggregate fluctuations (Gabaix
(2005)), and the finance-growth relationship (Beck et al. (2008)). Yet the determi-
nants of FSD, and how and why it varies across the world is not well understood.
At the same time, the importance of financial constraints for firm investment has
received much attention in the literature (see Desai et al. (2003) for a review). A
branch of this research program (exemplified by Kumar et al. (1999), Cooley and
Quadrini (2001), Cabral and Mata (2003), and Angelini and Generale (2008)) looks
at the effects of financial constraints on FSD through the lens of partial equilibrium
theoretical or empirical models. By contrast, our paper is motivated by general equi-
librium considerations about the origin of these financial constraints: we contend that
a common set of institutional determined frictions may be driving both the invest-
ment decisions of individual firms as well as the overall distribution of firm sizes, with
financial constraints and FSD interacting in general equilibrium through a number of
channel, among them, aggregate volatility and risk premia.
There are three crucial elements in this story: a fixed cost of market finance,
which ensures that only firms beyond a certain cut-off productivity level can afford
to go public, a variable cost (risk premium) for intermediated finance which is deter-
mined in equilibrium, and the presence of firm insiders.3 Weak institutional quality
3The first two elements of the environment are borrowed from the model of Champonnois (2010),
who posits a cost structure of intermediated versus market finance without explicitly modeling the
underlying frictions from which it arises.
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raises the fixed cost of market finance leading to fewer publicly listed firms as well
as lower stock market capitalization. It also worsens the conflict of interest between
insider-managers and outside investors over the use of cash-flows, leading to subop-
timal dividend policies. This creates a lack of investible resources in the economy,
pushing up intermediated financing costs for firms that are not productive enough to
pay the fixed cost of market finance. Inefficiencies in investment allocation are the
outcome. Thus poor investor protection leads to a positively skewed distribution of
firms, with a handful of public firms with inefficiently large capital stock, and a much
larger multitude of inefficiently small firms starved of financing. At the same time,
idiosyncratic shocks to the productivity of large firms cause the aggregate volatility
of output and investment to be higher due to the factors noted in Gabaix (2005),
leading to an additional feedback effect through the country risk premium.
The papers closest to ours are Champonnois (2008, 2010) and Desai et al. (2003)
who identify a number of channels that determine FSD, like contract enforcement,
product-market competition, goods substitutability, labor market flexibility, the risk
tolerance of external investors, and entry costs. In their study on the determinants
of FSD across the Central and East Europe (CEE) and Western Europe, Desai et al.
(2003) find that both the overall level of skewness and the relative skewness of firm-size
distributions for younger firms are a function of fairness and protection of property
rights with particularly amplified effects in the CEE. They conclude that these results
are consistent with capital constraints leading to skewness in firm-size distributions,
with the relative importance of these factors being greater in emerging markets.
Champonnois (2010) constructs a structural model of a firm’s decision to use in-
termediated versus market finance. Exploiting the variation in FSD across countries,
he identifies the cost of market finance (relative to intermediated finance) using the
model’s prediction that industries with small firms will raise disproportionately more
market finance (relative to intermediated finance) in countries with a lower relative
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cost of market finance. Champonnois (2008), using firm-level data from 23 countries
in Europe in 2003, finds in an industry-country panel that industry fixed effects ex-




The data source for FSD is ORBIS, which is a comprehensive database of com-
panies from Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. ORBIS coverage varies sharply
across countries. We use data for the years 2006 and 2007, the last two years for
which our primary independent variable, the Kaufmann et al. (2008) measure of in-
stitutional quality, is available. The variables of interest are firm size measured by
annual sales and number of employees. The data on risk premia, number of listed
firms, stock market capitalization, gross investment, gross fixed investment, and GDP
come from WorldBank (2008). Country-level controls such as GDP, per capita GDP,
financial development, and trade openness are from the WorldBank (2008), and the
index of financial openness is from Chinn and Ito (2008).
3.3.2 Description of independent variables
The quality of institutions is measured using the simple average of the six indices
in Kaufmann et al. (2008) that quantify general governance, the degree of corruption,
the rule of law, political stability, effectiveness of regulations, and voice (the strength
of media and public opinion). Though these are indicators of general institutional
quality and do not pertain directly to factors which affect the financing of firm, they
are a natural choice for the analysis because they are available for 213 countries.4
4Robustness checks are conducted with additional indices of institutional quality from LaPorta
et al. (1998b) which measure rule of law, risk of contract repudiation by the government, risk of
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Country controls are GDP in trillions of US dollars (USD) (size), per capita GDP
in thousands of USD (level of development), trade as a percentage of GDP (trade
openness), and domestic credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP (from the
WorldBank (2008)), and the financial openness index from Chinn and Ito (2008).
3.3.3 Description of dependent variables
Macroeconomic volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the growth
rates of GDP, consumption, gross capital formation, and gross fixed capital formation.
Intermediated financing costs are measured by the domestic risk premium while the
extent of market finance is measured by the number of listed firms and stock market
capitalization.
We use two proxies for firm size, the logarithm of sales and employment, both
denoted by sfij. This data is available at the level of a firm f belonging to country i
and industry j. Following Desai et al. (2003), the dependent variables in our regression
analysis are the simple average and skewness of the sample of firm sizes in country i







where Nij is the number of firms in industry j in country i. Skewness of the sample












where meanij is defined as above. We also perform a country-level analysis at a higher
level of aggregation using
expropriation by the government, accounting standards, efficiency of the judicial system, the anti-
director index, and the creditor-rights index. However the last two are available only for the 49








where Ni is the number of firms in country i. Skewness of the sample of firm sizes in












As noted by di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), the coverage of ORBIS varies
widely across countries, with smaller firms under-represented in the majority of coun-
tries. To deal with this issue, we estimate the exponent of a Pareto distribution from
the FSD data after selecting a minimum cut-off for firm size using visual inspection
of the density graphs for each country, as detailed in Gabaix. Following Gabaix and




) = ai − bi.log(sizefij)




The following graphs provide partial correlations between four measures of aggre-
gate volatility and the measure of institutional quality.
We also estimate four separate country-level regressions of the following form
SD(growth)i = α + β
′
Xi + εi (3.1)
5We estimate bi for the set of 44 countries in di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). Their sample is
restricted to countries that have sales figures for at least 1000 firms. Our estimates are provided in
the appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Consumption volatility (2000-2008) and Institution Quality. Data source:
WorldBank (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
where SDi are the four standard deviations and Xi is a set of country-level con-
trols. The results (reported in appendix C.2) show that volatility, measured by the
standard deviation of GDP and consumption growth rates, is robustly negatively
correlated with general institutional quality while controlling for country size, level
of general development, trade openness, financial development, and financial open-
ness. Volatility measured by the standard deviation of gross investment and gross
fixed investment growth, is negatively correlated with general institutional quality
while controlling for country size, level of general development, trade openness, and
financial openness. However, institutions are not a statistically significant determi-
nant of volatility when controlling for the financial development of a country. This
is not surprising because financial development, measured here by domestic credit to
the private sector as a percentage of GDP, affects investment directly, while in turn
being influenced by the quality of domestic institutions in possibly non-linear ways.
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Figure 3.2: GDP volatility (2000-2008) and Institution Quality. Data source: World-
Bank (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
3.3.4.2 Country risk premium
We repeat the exercise with a measure of aggregate intermediated financing costs
(the country risk premium). The scatter plot shows better institutional quality is
partially negatively correlated with lower risk premia.
However, estimation of the country-level regression (results not reported)
risk premiumi = α + β
′
Xi + εi (3.2)
with a set of country-level controls, Xi, reveals that financing costs, measured by
the country risk premium, though partially negatively correlated with institutional
quality, is insignificantly so when controlling for the general development of a country
as measured by its per capita GDP.
3.3.4.3 Prevalence of market finance
The scatter plot below shows that both of our measures of the prevalence of
market finance, the logarithm of the number of listed firms and stock market capital-
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Figure 3.3: Gross capital formation volatility (2000-2008) and Institution Quality.
Data source: WorldBank (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
ization as a percentage of GDP, are partially negatively correlated with the measure
of institutional quality.
As before, we estimate two separate country-level regressions, one for each measure
of market finance.
mkt fini = α + β
′
Xi + εi (3.3)
where Xi is a set of country-level controls. We find that both measures of the preva-
lence of market finance are negatively correlated with general institutional quality
while controlling for country size and level of general development (see appendix
C.2). However, institutions are not a statistically significant determinant of market
finance prevalence when controlling for the financial development of a country using
domestic credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP. This, as noted before, is
not surprising.
82
Figure 3.4: Gross fixed capital formation volatility (2000-2008) and Institution Qual-
ity. Data source: WorldBank (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
3.3.4.4 Mean and skewness of firm sizes at the country level
The distribution of the logarithm of the firm size proxies are approximately nor-
mal. The following figure presents the non-parametric (kernel density) estimates of
the world FSD using the country-level mean logarithm of sales in 2006. The first
graph in the panel is for the entire sample of countries, while the second one includes
only those countries for which ORBIS covers at least 100 firms. The line with the
higher peak is the estimated FSD in the sample of countries with below median insti-
tutional quality. Visually, the estimated FSD show that countries with above median
institutional quality have frequency weights more evenly spread out among firm sizes
than countries with below median institutions. Thus, smaller firms appear to have
a higher chance of coming into existence and surviving in such countries. On the
other hand, the proportion of medium-sized firms is much larger than the proportion
of smaller firms in countries with below average institutional quality. This pattern
is consistent with the story that firms with low productivity find it harder to raise
external finance in such countries due to the higher equilibrium cost of intermediated
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Figure 3.5: Financing Costs (2000-2008) and Institution Quality. Data source:
WorldBank (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
finance. We also find this pattern for the sales data in 2007 and the employment data
for 2006-2007. The graphs are shown in appendix C.2.
To investigate this pattern more closely, we estimate country-level regressions with
the mean and skewness of firm sizes in each country as the dependent variable, using
both measures of firm size. We only include countries that have a minimum number
of firm size observations for the following reasons.6 First, the mean and skewness
cannot be meaningfully interpreted if calculated from too few observations. Second,
ORBIS coverage varies markedly across countries and is correlated with country size,
capital market openness, and most importantly for our purposes, institutional quality.
Thus our mean and skewness estimates might be correlated with institutional quality
because of ORBIS’s sampling process.7 The estimated regressions are
meani = α + β
′
Xi + εi (3.4)
6We experiment with various cut-offs and report results for a cut-off of 100 observations.
7The results for skewness are quite different for the entire sample which includes many countries
with very few observations.
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Figure 3.6: Market capitalization (2000-2009) and Institution Quality. Data source:
WorldBank (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
and
skewi = α + β
′
Xi + εi. (3.5)
The results (reported in appendix C.2) show that mean firm size is robustly neg-
atively correlated with general institutional quality. This indicates that on average,
smaller firms have a higher chance of formation and survival in countries with better
institutional quality.
The conclusion for the skewness of firm sizes is more tentative because the results
are sensitive to the cut-off minimum number of observation that is used to determine
the sample. As noted before, there is reason to believe that the process by which
ORBIS samples firms might affect our results for low cut-offs. We use a cut-off of 100
observations for our benchmark reported results. Overall, the regressions indicate
that countries with stronger institutions have a firm size distribution that is more
skewed towards smaller firms, that is, have a higher positive value of skewness on
average.
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Figure 3.7: Logarithm of number of listed firms (2000-2009) and Institution Quality.
Data source: WorldBank (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
These regressions do not control for the industry composition of a country’s firms.
Since different industries, due to technological reasons, have fundamentally different
FSD, it is possible that the country-level analysis is just picking up the relative
prevalence of certain industries in certain countries. To rule out this possibility, we
extend this analysis in the next section to include industry dummies.
3.3.4.5 Mean and skewness of firm sizes with industry dummies
We run the same regressions using data at the country-industry level of aggrega-
tion. Our dependent variables are now mean and skewness of firm size in country
i and industry j. Our sample of countries is further eroded since we now estimate
these at a higher level of disaggregation and only include country-industry pairs that
have a minimum number of firm size observations.




δj + εij (3.6)
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Figure 3.8: Firm size distributions using logarithm of 2006 sales. Data source: ORBIS
and Kaufmann et al. (2008)




δj + εij (3.7)
where δj is a dummy for industry j. j runs from 0 to 9 for the ten broad one-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code industries. The results (reported
in appendix C.2) show that mean firm size and skewness are robustly negatively
correlated with general institutional quality across countries, within each one-digit
SIC industry. This indicates that on average, smaller firms have a higher chance of
formation and survival in countries with better institutional quality, while controlling
for the specific technological characteristics of a particular industry.8
Institutional quality is not significantly correlated with the skewness of firm sizes
when industry dummies are included. However, because of the reduction in sample
size when using country-industry pairs, it is harder to draw a firm conclusion regarding
this effect. At the same time, the finding is consistent with those in Champonnois
8All one-digit SIC industries show this feature except the government sector (SIC 9).
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(2008), who finds that industry factors explain more of the variation in the parameters
of FSD around the world than country factors.
3.3.4.6 Country level regressions with estimated Pareto exponent
We use the Pareto exponents estimate, bi, for the truncated FSD in each country
to run a cross country regression of the following form
bi = α + β
′
Xi + εi (3.8)
for the countries in the sample of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009). The estimated
β shows the value of the Pareto exponent to be significantly positively correlated with
institutional quality. This can be interpreted as saying that if we take into account
only the upper tail of the FSD in the set of countries that have comparable data,
better institutional quality is associated with a higher proportion of relatively large
firms.9 Though this finding should be interpreted with caution, it can be argued that
firms have a better chance of finding the financial resources to expand in a country
with better institutional quality.10
3.4 Discussion and conclusion
This paper establishes four broad stylized facts related to institutional quality.
We find, using country and industry level regressions, that countries with stronger
domestic institutions have smaller average firm sizes and a more positively skewed
FSD overall, while having a higher proportion of large firms when taking into account
only the upper tail of the FSD. They also exhibit lower macroeconomic volatility,
measured by the standard deviation of the growth rates of GDP and consumption,
9The truncation point is different for each country in practice. However, the result holds even
when the same truncation point is selected for each country, at the cost of goodness of fit.
10In a regression with multiple controls, financial variables like domestic capital market develop-
ment and financial openness are positive and significant.
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use more market finance, measured by the number of listed companies and market
capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and have lower domestic risk premia. These
results hold more strongly for a cross section of countries than an industry-country
cross section, suggesting that the industrial structure of countries plays a large role in
determining its FSD. However, since industrial structure may itself be an outcome of
country-level factors like institutional quality, a significant role for the latter cannot
be ruled out.
Firm vintage has been shown to be an important determinant of the skewness of
FSD in a number of studies such as Cabral and Mata (2003), Desai et al. (2003),
and Angelini and Generale (2008). For example, in their study of Portugese firms,
Cabral and Mata (2003) find that firm age is a more important determinant of the
skewness of the FSD than firm selection: the FSD for firms which survived between
1984 and 1991 was substantially less skewed in 1991 than in 1984. A drawback of our
analysis is that we do not estimate FSD for different vintages of firms. However, such
an extension is likely to strengthen the main finding of this paper, that FSD is more
skewed in countries with weaker domestic institutional quality, because these papers
find that the FSD for younger firms is more skewed than those for older firms.
Another shortcoming is that the empirical specifications used in this paper, though
guided by some priors, are not derived from an underlying structural model. This
paper can be seen as a first step in this direction – we compile some basic stylized
facts about micro level FSD and macro level volatility that such a model must try to
replicate. An important area of future inquiry may be the theoretical link between









Table A.1: Data sources
Source paper Data Countries Coverage
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) External wealth 145 1970-2004
Heston et al. (2006) Capital stock, Investment 188 1950-2004
Kho et al. (2006) Insider ownership 46 1994, 2004
LaPorta et al. (1998b) Governance 49 NA
Kaufmann et al. (2008) Governance 212 1996-2007




Sample 1: Intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998b), and cov-
ered by WorldBank (2008), excluding financial centers Ireland and Switzerland (total
FA + FL > 150% of GDP). 43 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United King-
dom United States, Uruguay and Zimbabwe. The original LaPorta et al. (1998b)
sample covers 49 countries from Europe, North and South America, Africa, Asia, and
Australia. There are no socialist or transition economies in their sample. A country
is selected for inclusion by them, if, on the basis of the Worldscope sample of 15,900
firms from 33 countries and the Moodys International sample of 15,100 non-U.S. firms
from 92 countries, that country had at least 5 domestic nonfinancial publicly traded
firms with no government ownership in 1993.
Sample 2: This sample is used to test if worse institutions affect portfolios
primarily through increasing insider ownership and decreasing the float portfolio.
Intersection of set of countries used in Kho et al. (2006), and covered by WorldBank
(2008), excluding financial centers Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (total FA
+ FL > 150% of GDP). 34 countries are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey,
United Kingdom and United States.
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A.1.3 Correlations between governance indices and dependent variables
The following table shows the correlations between my dependent variables, which
are foreign assets and liabilities as a fraction of GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)),
and the six components of my institutional quality measure, taken from Kaufmann
et al. (2008). All six measures show high correlation with the dependent variables,
except for “voice”. Thus the relationship between the institutional quality measure,
which is the simple average of the six measures, and the dependent variables is not
likely to be driven by a single measure.
Table A.2: Pairwise correlations of dependent variables and individual components







General governance 0.7018 0.7267 0.6222
Corruption 0.6809 0.7029 0.6064
Rule of law 0.6088 0.6367 0.5320
Political stability 0.6023 0.6141 0.5461
Regulations 0.6611 0.6633 0.6129
Voice 0.4686 0.5033 0.3927
The following table shows that the institutional quality measure is correlated with
the measures constructed by LaPorta et al. (1998b). The measure seeks to capture
those aspects of general institutional quality which facilitate contract enforcement
between outside investors and insiders. It should be noted here that the anti-director
index and the creditor-rights index constructed by LaPorta et al. (1998b), which
are more direct measures of investor protection and creditor protection respectively,
are weakly correlated with the above measures. This is because the presence of
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protective laws is related to the legal origin of the country. I place more importance
on institutional quality as a good proxy for the enforcement of rules.
Table A.3: Pairwise correlations of institutional quality index and select indices from
LaPorta et al. (1998b) (for Sample 1)
rulelaw repud riskexp account effjud
Institutional quality 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.52 0.69
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Table A.4: Pairwise correlations of dependent and independent variables. FA: Foreign







Institutional quality 0.6458 0.7217 0.5224
GDP 0.6211 0.6944 0.5022




Dom. credit to pvt. sec.
GDP
0.6241 0.6662 0.5330
FA: Foreign FDI and Portfolio Assets; FL: Foreign FDI and Portfolio Liabilities;
rulelaw: Rule of law; repud: Risk of contract repudiation by government; riskexp:
Risk of expropriation by government; account: Accounting standards; effjud: Effi-
ciency of judicial system. Data source: LaPorta et al. (1998b), Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007), Kaufmann et al. (2008) and WorldBank (2008). Sample: intersection
of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998b), and covered by WorldBank (2008),
excluding financial centers Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (total FA + FL >
150% of GDP).
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Table A.5: Ownership concentration in low and high institutional quality nations:
two-sample t-test across two groups of countries with below and above
median quality of institutions
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
low (0) 19 .5462579 .0342863 .1494505 .4742251 .6182907
high (1) 18 .3990222 .0395198 .1676683 .3156427 .4824017
combined 37 .4746297 .0284791 .1732316 .4168714 .532388
diff .1472357 .0521535 .0413584 .2531129
H0: diff = 0 d.f.= 35
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff 6= 0 Ha: diff >0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9961 Pr(|T | > |t|) = 0.0078 Pr(T > t) = 0.0039
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A.2 Regressions
Table A.6: Foreign assets: OLS regression coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institutions .045∗∗∗(.008) .047∗∗∗(.009) .035∗∗(.016) .025∗∗(.012) .032∗∗∗(.011)
GDP -.014(.01) -.023(.015) -.005(.01) .007(.012)
GDP p.c. .004(.005) .004(.004) .004(.003)
Trade/GDP .002∗∗∗(.0004) .002∗∗∗(.0003)
Fin. dev. -.0009(.0007)
Constant -.022(.015) -.02(.014) -.019(.015) -.124∗∗∗(.024) -.104∗∗∗(.023)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43
Adj. R-squared 0.4807 0.4792 0.4748 0.7168 0.7264
Point estimates of regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors in brackets, rounded to three or four significant digits. Specifications (1), (2),
(3), (4) and (5), all with a constant term, consecutively add the regressors mentioned
in the first column. Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. Dependent variable: total foreign portfolio and FDI assets.
Independent variables: Institutional quality index is the square of the Kaufmann
et al. (2008) index normalized such that the country with the lowest score is 0; GDP
in trillions of USD; per capita GDP in thousands of USD; trade as percentage of
GDP; domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP. Data sources: Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Kaufmann et al. (2008) and WorldBank (2008). Sample:
intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998b), and covered by World-
97
Bank (2008), excluding financial centers Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (total
FA + FL > 150% of GDP).
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Table A.7: Foreign liabilities: OLS regression coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institutions .031∗∗∗(.007) .034∗∗∗(.008) .049∗∗∗(.011) .04∗∗∗(.008) .045∗∗∗(.008)
GDP -.023∗∗(.01) -.011(.012) .005(.008) .014(.009)
GDP p.c. -.005(.004) -.005∗∗(.002) -.006∗∗(.003)
Trade/GDP .002∗∗∗(.0002) .002∗∗∗(.0001)
Fin. dev. -.0006(.0003)
Constant .086∗∗∗(.019) .09∗∗∗(.018) .089∗∗∗(.018) -.006(.021) .008(.023)
Observations 43 43 43 43 43
Adj. R-squared 0.3528 0.3830 0.3912 0.6987 0.7026
Point estimates of regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors in brackets, rounded to three or four significant digits. Specifications (1), (2),
(3), (4) and (5), all with a constant term, consecutively add the regressors mentioned
in the first column. Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively. Dependent variable: total foreign portfolio and FDI liabilities.
Independent variables: Institutional quality index is the square of the Kaufmann
et al. (2008) index normalized such that the country with the lowest score is 0; GDP
in trillions of USD; per capita GDP in thousands of USD; trade as percentage of
GDP; domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP. Data sources: Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Kaufmann et al. (2008) and WorldBank (2008). Sample:
intersection of set of countries used in LaPorta et al. (1998b), and covered by World-
Bank (2008), excluding financial centers Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland (total
FA + FL > 150% of GDP).
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A.3 Some analytical results
A.3.1 Planner’s problem
The social planner allocates consumption between outsiders of the two countries
taking the sum of income (labor and dividend income) in each period as given (de-
noted by subscript “eq”). Since the planner has a static allocation problem after the
realization of the state st, I drop the state notation. Since asset trade takes place







∗ = ψ0qaeqYaeq + ψ
∗
0qbeqYbeq + (1− α)Deq + (1− α)eeqD∗eq






Portfolios which yield this allocation of consumption between outsiders will effectively
replicate the constrained Pareto efficient allocation in this economy.
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A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the budget constraints of the outsiders in the two countries.
C(st) + P (st)(λNN(s
t)− λNN(st−1)) + e(st)P ∗(st)(λNS(st)− λNS(st−1))
= qa(s
















With time invariant optimal portfolio shares the budget constraints reduce to
C(st) = qa(s









































t)[{1− f(st)}{Ya(st)} −W (st)L(st)]− {K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)}
D∗(st) = qb(s
t)[{1− f ∗(st)}{Yb(st)} −W ∗(st)L∗(st)]− {K∗(st)− (1− δ)K∗(st−1)}
can be written as
D(st) = qa(s
t)Ya(s
t)[ψ1 − ψ0]− I(st)
D∗(st) = qb(s
t)Yb(s
t)[[ψ1 − ψ0]]− I∗(st)
where





η + α− 1
η
Thus the budget constraints reduce to
C(st) = ψ0y(s





[(ψ1 − ψ0)y(st)− I(st)] + λSS[(ψ1 − ψ0)y∗(st)− I∗(st)]
where, for notational simplicity, I have
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I(st) = K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1)







With logarithmic utility, the planner’s constrained Pareto efficient consumption allo-
cations are
C(st) = e(st)C∗(st)
If there exists a portfolio share λ such that this condition holds for all states, then λ
must satisfy
C(st)−e(st)C∗(st) = [ψ0+(ψ1−ψ0)(2λ+α−1)]{y(st)−e(st)y∗(st)}−(2λ+α−1){I(st)−e(st)I∗(st)} = 0
where I have expressed all portfolio shares in terms of λ by using symmetry and
market clearing in asset markets, which imply
λNN = λ
λSN = 1− α− λ




















Henceforth for all variables x, ∆x(st) denotes the value of x(st)− e(st)x∗(st). There-
fore
∆y(st) = y(st)− e(st)y∗(st)
= (2ω − 1){Y (st)− e(st)Y ∗(st)}
= (2ω − 1)∆Y (st)
Using the final-goods market-clearing conditions and the expression for the insiders’
consumption demand
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Y (st) = C(st) +K(st)− (1− δ)K(st−1) +M(st) + Φ(st)
Y ∗(st) = Cm∗(s
t) +K∗(st)− (1− δ)K∗(st−1) +M∗(st) + Φ∗(st)
M(st) = αD(st) + qa(s
t)f(st)Ya(s
t)− Φ(st)
M∗(st) = αD∗(st) + qb(s
t)f ∗(st)Yb(s
t)− Φ∗(st)
together with the expressions for the optimal stealing fraction and dividends, we have
∆y(st) = (2ω − 1)∆Y (st)








{∆C(st) + (1− α)∆I(st)}
where
ψ2 = 1− (2ω − 1){αθ +
(1 + θ)(1− α)2
2η
}
Now, plugging in the value of ∆y(st) in the expression for ∆C(st), we get, for some
constant µ
µ∆C(st) = [ψ2
−1(1− α)(2ω − 1){ψ0 + (ψ1 − ψ0)(2λ+ α− 1)} − (2λ+ α− 1)]∆I(st)
This expression gives us the value of the portfolio share, λ, that will ensure that
the complete markets condition, ∆C(st) = 0, holds for all states. The value of λ is
calculated by simply assuming this the condition holds, and then solving for λ.
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This completes the proof of Proposition 1 in section (1.4.2).
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Since portfolio shares are constant, consumption of Northern and Southern out-
siders can be written as,
C(st) = qa(s











t)W (st)L(st) by L and qb(st)W ∗(st)L∗(st) by L∗. λ ensures that
C(st) = e(st)C∗(st)
Plugging in the values for consumption and log-linearizing the above relationship
around the symmetric steady-state we get,
L̄L̂+D̄D̂λ+ēD̄∗D̂∗(1−α−λ)+ēD̄∗ê(1−α−λ) = ēL̄∗L̂∗+ēL̄∗ê+D̄D̂(1−α−λ)+ēD̄∗D̂∗λ+ēD̄∗êλ
Gathering terms and noting that D̄∗ = D̄, L̄∗ = L̄, ē = 1 in a symmetric
equilibrium we get
(2λ+ α− 1)D̄(D̂ − ê− D̂∗) = L̄(L̂− ê− L̂∗)
Denoting (D̂ − ê− D̂∗) as ∆D̂ and (L̂− ê− L̂∗) as ∆L̂ we get
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(2λ+ α− 1)D̄∆D̂ = L̄∆L̂
which gives,




Solving for λ gives the result.
A.3.4 The steady-state with symmetric countries (and Cobb-Douglas)









and Lss = L∗ss, ψ0 = ψ
∗
0, ψ1 = ψ
∗
1. Thus the non-stochastic steady-state values
of all other variables can be expressed in terms of just Lss when the countries are












































































































































+ δ − 1)− δ
]
Kss (A.16)
Css = (1− α)Dss + qssa W ssLss (A.17)
C∗ss = (1− α)D∗ss + q∗ssb W ∗ssL∗ss (A.18)
































The parameters η and η∗ are selected such that steady state dividends are positive.
In particular
η >
(1− α){θ(1− α)(1− 1
β
)− (2− α)( 1
β
+ δ − 1)}
(1− 2α)( 1
β







































ess = 1 (A.31)
As in other models with portfolio selection like Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and
Heathcote and Perri (2009), the value of portfolios in the non-stochastic steady-
state is indeterminate. With ex-ante symmetric countries, any symmetric value of
{λNN , λSS} is an equilibrium, so that
λNN = λSS ∈ [0, 1] (A.32)
λSN = 1− α− λNN (A.33)
λNS = 1− α∗ − λSS (A.34)
As a reminder





η + α− 1
η
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A.3.5 The steady-state with asymmetric countries
The steady-state value of {Kss, K∗ss} can be expressed in terms of {qssa , q∗ssa , qssb , q∗ssb },

























Substituting in the production function for intermediate goods we get



























and from the definition of dividends, the budget constraints of the four agents, and





















+ δ − 1)− δ
]
K∗ss (A.41)
Css = Y ss −M ss − Iss − Φss (A.42)
C∗ss = Y ∗ss −M∗ss − I∗ss − Φ∗ss (A.43)





































The trade balance is zero in the steady-state. Using this fact, and the first order
















ωρ + (1− ω)ρ
Y ssb (A.57)



































where t is the terms of trade of the North, all in terms of K and K∗. Using the
expression connecting K and K∗ to qa and q
∗
b , and the first order conditions for



















































Note that we can get symmetric countries as a special case of the above, when ζ = ζ∗.
For the general aggregating function, we have, following the same procedure
qssa =
[



































































































This section contains descriptions of the numerical algorithms used in the paper.
A.4.1 Algorithm for computing approximate equilibrium for outsiders
1. The first step is to find a point around which to approximate the decision rules.
This point is the unique stationary solution to the set of equilibrium conditions of the
model, for the case when there is no uncertainty, that is, the scale parameter of the
variance of the driving shocks is equal to zero. This is called the non-stochastic steady-
state. To ensure stationarity of all variables, and a zero-current account, I follow
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) in positing a convex portfolio adjustment cost, which
pins down a unique non-stochastic steady-state for portfolio variables, and hence for fi-
nancial wealth. The approximation point for portfolio shares, (λNN , λNS), (λSN , λSS)
is arbitrary at this juncture, because in the non-stochastic steady-state, any portfo-
lio share which keeps the wealth distribution unchanged with respect to the initial
endowment of shares, is an equilibrium. We assume a small convex adjustment cost
of changing portfolios from (λNN , λNS), (λSN , λSS). This is done to keep the foreign
wealth position of each country stationary. As noted by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2003), this modification does not significantly affect the dynamics of other macroe-
conomic variables at the level of approximation that these models are analyzed. This
technique is also used by Heathcote and Perri (2009), and like them I find that the
cost of adjustment τ , can be set to an arbitrarily small positive number. Of course,
the higher τ is set, the less portfolio shares will diverge from the chosen value of
(λNN , λNS), (λSN , λSS). In this model, I set τ to be 0.00001% of the un-weighted
average steady-state stock price. Thus the budget constraint of the outsider in the
North is as follows.
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C(st) + P (st)(λNN(s









t)− λNS)2 = qa(st)W (st)L(st) + λNN(st−1)D(st) + λNS(st−1)e(st)D∗(st)
(A.78)
The steady-state values of all variables are provided in the previous section.
2. Around the chosen stationary steady-state, I find second-order Taylor series ap-
proximation of the optimal dynamics of the control and state variables using the
algorithm developed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
A.4.2 Second-order optimal dynamics
This section provides a brief review of the approximation technique described in
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), henceforth referred to as SGU, which is used to
solve the model.1 The n equations characterizing the stochastic equilibrium of this
economy can be written in the form
Etf(yt+1, yt, xt+1, xt) = 0, f : <ny×ny×nx×nx → <n
y is a ny × 1 vector of control variables and x = (x1, x2)
′
is a nx × 1 vector of
state variables, where x1 and x2 are respectively (nx − nε)× 1 and nε × 1 vectors of
endogenous and exogenous state variables. The non-stochastic steady-state values of
the arguments of f(.) are denoted by the set {yss, xss}, and these values can be solved
from
f(yss, yss, xss, xss) = 0
1In general, though the certainty-equivalent non-stochastic steady-state, and first-order approx-
imate solution of the model are the same, they do not coincide with the true stochastic solution.
This is because second or higher order terms of the true solution are significant in the presence of
uncertainty. See Kim and Kim (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) for further discussions
of this point.
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Lemma 5. For the dynamic system described in the previous sections, there ex-
ists a unique, interior stationary solution for all non-portfolio variables, denoted by
{yss, xss}(−λ).
Proof: See previous section for steady state values. (A.3.4)
Following the notation of SGU, the solution to the model can be written in the
form of two functions, g(x, σ) which is the optimal policy function, and h(x, σ) which
describes the transition of both the endogenous and exogenous states. Thus
y = g(x, σ)
x
′
= h(x, σ) + ησε
′
where η is a nx×nε matrix, partly zeros, describing the variance-covariance structure
of the errors in the exogenous driving variables, which in this case are technology
in the Northern and Southern intermediate goods sector. The two functions g(x, σ)
and h(x, σ) are approximated up to the second order by writing them as functions of
the first and second derivative of the function f in the neighborhood of the approx-
imation point {yss, xss}. By solving a system of linear equations whose co-efficient
matrix comprises of these numerical derivatives of the known function f , the SGU
algorithm arrives at the functions g(x, σ) and h(x, σ). The row of the approximated
policy function g(x, σ) that is of paramount interest to us is the one which specifies
stochastic-equilibrium portfolio allocations, λ(x, σ), as a function of the state vari-
ables, and uncertainty. Further details of this method can be found in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2004).2
2A possible issue with this approximation technique is that it ignores the possible heteroscedas-
ticity in the endogenous variables (see Evans and Hnatkovska (2007) for a discussion). In the context
of this model, this is less of a problem because the feedback mechanism from asset returns, which
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A.4.3 Algorithm for choosing portfolio approximation point
We search in the neighborhood of a set of points (λNN , λSS) ⊂ [0, 1]× [0, 1] for the
“correct” (in a sense that will be defined below) portfolio approximation point. We
search among those points that keep (non-stochastic) steady-state wealth distribution
constant, and the current account balanced.
Lemma 6. The following locus of portfolios keeps (non-stochastic) steady-state wealth
distribution constant, and the current account balanced.
λNNP
ss − λSSP ∗ssess = (1− α)P ss − (1− α∗)P ∗ssess
Proof: Recall that the non-stochastic steady-state values of all variables except port-
folio shares are determinate. Also they are independent of the value of the portfolio
shares, for example, labor incomes in any steady-state are independent of λNN and
λNS. Thus in any two non-stochastic steady-states (λNN , λNS) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1], denoted









∗ssess = (1− α)Dss
Using the stock market clearing condition in the North, and the expression for steady-
state stock prices, this reduces to the condition in the statement of the lemma. Also
note that using the stock market clearing conditions in each country, and the expres-
sion for stock steady-state stock prices




ss − λSSP ∗ssess = (1− α)P ss − (1− α∗)P ∗ssess (A.79)
⇒ λSNP ss = λNSP ∗ssess (A.80)
which implies that net steady-state transfers are zero. This means the current account
is balanced.
A.4.4 Algorithm for insider’s choice of ownership
We are seeking a maximum of the function that maps insider ownership to ex-
pected lifetime utility of the insider.
1. Start with an initial distribution of ownership, α∗
′
.
2. Use the “golden search” algorithm. Choose an interval for α, say [αmin, αmax].
3. Approximate optimal decision rules of economy around steady-state with own-
ership αmin and αmax. Home stock ownership of the Southern insider given by the






4. Simulate economy with above decision rules around αmin and αmax. Calculate
average utility of insider in simulations. Update interval according to “golden search”
algorithm.
5. Repeat till convergence occurs.
A.5 Calibration and variables
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Table A.8: Notation and calibration
Notation Explanation
Goods
a North intermediate good used in North
b South intermediate good used in North
a∗ North intermediate good used in South
b∗ South intermediate good used in South
Ya Total North intermediate good produced
Yb Total South intermediate good produced
Price of goods and services
qa North intermediate good price in North
qb South intermediate good price in North
q∗a North intermediate good price in South
q∗b South intermediate good price in South
W,W ∗ North, South wages
e Real exchange rate
t Terms of trade
Asset market quantities and prices
P, P ∗ North, South stock prices
α, α∗ Insider ownership in the North, South
λNN North outsider’s ownership of Northern asset
λSN South outsider’s ownership of Northern asset
λNS North outsider’s ownership of Southern asset
λSS South outsider’s ownership of Southern asset
Parameters
β = 0.99 Discount factor
θ = 0.34 Capital share
δ = 0.025 Depreciation
ω = 0.15 Import share
Z(t) = 0.91Z(t− 1) + ε(t) Domestic shocks
Z∗(t) = 0.91Z∗(t− 1) + ε∗(t) Foreign shocks
σ2ε = 0.006
2 Variance of technology shocks
120
APPENDIX B
Appendices for “Fire-Sale FDI or Business as
Usual?”
B.1 Patterns of MA in Asia during 1990-2008
Figure B.1: Total numbers of MA and numbers in three categories
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Figure B.2: Percentages of MA in three categories
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B.2 Survival stylized facts




























South Korea-No Crisis-Foreign 0.242***
(4.31)












Table B.2: Cox model with a complete set of country, crisis, foreign, financial acquir-
ing firm, and same digit SIC dummies and interactions (Taiwan baseline





crisis and high and foracq 0.800***
crisis and high and domacq 0.621***
crisis and high and finacq -0.238**
Table B.3: Cox model with country, crisis-country, foreign and financial acquiring








South Korea-No Crisis-Foreign 0.272***
(4.21)












Table B.4: Cox model with a complete set of country, crisis, foreign, financial acquir-
ing firm, and same digit SIC dummies and interactions (Taiwan baseline
hazard, with non-Asian countries included). Selected coefficients reported.
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APPENDIX C
Appendices for “The Aggregate Consequences of
Imperfect Institutions”
C.1 FSD graphs
Figure C.1: Firm size distributions using logarithm of 2007 sales. Data source: OR-
BIS and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
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Figure C.2: Firm size distributions using logarithm of 2006 employees. Data source:
ORBIS and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
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Figure C.3: Firm size distributions using logarithm of 2007 employees. Data source:
ORBIS and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
C.2 Regressions tables
The following tables present point estimates of regression coefficients with robust
standard errors. The dependent variables are different in each table. The independent
variables are chosen from the following set: institutional quality (insti, measured by
the index from Kaufmann et al. (2008)), size (size, GDP in trillions of USD), level of
general development (devgen, per capita GDP in thousands of USD), trade openness
(tradeopen, trade as percentage of GDP), financial development (devfin, domestic
credit to private sector as percentage of GDP), and financial openness (finopen, using



















Table C.1: Aggregate volatility: OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. This table presents point estimates of regres-
sion coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets,
rounded to three significant digits. Columns labeled (1) and (2) are re-
gressions for aggregate volatility measured by standard deviation of GDP
and consumption growth rates over the period 2000-2008. Independent
variables are the institutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008),
GDP in trillions of USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade
as percentage of GDP, domestic credit to private sector as percentage of
GDP, and the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data
sources: Kaufmann et al. (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), and WorldBank
(2008). Coefficients marked ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and

















Table C.2: Aggregate volatility: OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors. This table presents point estimates of regres-
sion coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets,
rounded to three significant digits. Columns labeled (1) and (2) are re-
gressions for aggregate volatility measured by standard deviation of gross
capital formation and gross fixed capital formation growth rates over the
period 2000-2008. Independent variables are the institutional quality in-
dex from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions of USD, per capita
GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of GDP, and the financial
openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kaufmann et al.
(2008), Chinn and Ito (2008) and WorldBank (2008). Coefficients marked
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Sample:













Table C.3: Prevalence of market finance: OLS regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. This table presents point es-
timates of regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors in brackets, rounded to three significant digits. Columns labeled
(1) and (2) are regressions for the prevalence of market finance measured
by market capitalization normalized by GDP and the logarithm of the
number of listed firms over the period 2000-2008. Independent variables
are the institutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in
trillions of USD and per capita GDP in thousands of USD. Data sources:
Kaufmann et al. (2008) and WorldBank (2008). Coefficients marked ∗∗∗,
∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Sample: varying































Table C.4: Mean firm sizes (log sales in 2006 and 2007): OLS regression coefficients
with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. This table presents point
estimates of regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors in brackets, rounded to three significant digits. Columns labeled
(1) and (2) are regressions for country-level mean firm sizes in 2006 and
2007 respectively measured by log sales. Independent variables are the in-
stitutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions of
USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of GDP,
domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, and the financial
openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kaufmann et al.
(2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS. Coefficients































Table C.5: Mean firm sizes for countries with> 100 observations (log sales in 2006 and
2007): OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors. This table presents point estimates of regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three
significant digits. Columns labeled (1) and (2) are regressions for country-
level mean firm sizes in 2006 and 2007 respectively measured by log sales.
Independent variables are the institutional quality index from Kaufmann
et al. (2008), GDP in trillions of USD, per capita GDP in thousands of
USD, trade as percentage of GDP, domestic credit to private sector as
percentage of GDP, and the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito
(2008). Data sources: Kaufmann et al. (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008),
WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS. Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti06 0.126** 0.107* 0.073 -0.004 -0.004 0.058
(2.11) (1.78) (0.83) (-0.03) (-0.03) (0.45)
size06 0.180*** 0.172** 0.142* 0.142* 0.137*
(2.65) (2.42) (1.98) (1.76) (1.70)
devgen06 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.62) (0.76) (0.73) (0.60)






constant -0.102** -0.135*** -0.157*** -0.236*** -0.235* -0.176
(-2.00) (-2.64) (-2.77) (-2.95) (-1.89) (-1.17)
R2 0.057 0.136 0.139 0.155 0.155 0.167
N 89 87 87 85 85 84
Table C.6: Skewness of firm sizes for countries with > 100 observations (log sales in
2006): OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors. This table presents point estimates of regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three sig-
nificant digits. Columns labeled (1), (2), and so forth are regressions for
country-level skewness of firm sizes in 2006 measured by log sales adding
one independent variable at a time. Independent variables are the insti-
tutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions of
USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of GDP,
domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, and the financial
openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kaufmann et al.
(2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS. Coefficients
marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti06 0.021 0.018 -0.105 -0.203** -0.203* -0.235*
(0.38) (0.30) (-1.28) (-2.00) (-1.96) (-1.97)
size06 0.224*** 0.186** 0.129 0.173* 0.157
(2.82) (2.20) (1.57) (1.82) (1.60)
devgen06 0.012** 0.018** 0.015 0.017
(2.53) (2.22) (1.65) (1.61)






constant -0.117** -0.142** -0.236*** -0.336*** -0.463*** -0.487***
(-2.32) (-2.60) (-3.46) (-3.67) (-3.49) (-3.32)
R2 0.001 0.036 0.063 0.074 0.087 0.093
N 170 160 160 152 146 143
Table C.7: Skewness of firm sizes for countries for entire sample (log sales in 2006):
OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors. This table presents point estimates of regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three
significant digits. Columns labeled (1), (2), and so forth are regressions
for country-level skewness of firm sizes in 2006 measured by log sales
adding one independent variable at a time. Independent variables are the
institutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions
of USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of
GDP, domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, and the
financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kauf-
mann et al. (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS.
Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti07 0.157** 0.139** 0.152* 0.136 0.135 0.256*
(2.45) (2.17) (1.74) (1.36) (1.35) (1.93)
size07 0.169** 0.172** 0.171** 0.182** 0.169**
(2.50) (2.55) (2.32) (2.11) (2.01)
devgen07 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.29) (-0.01) (-0.09) (-0.05)






constant -0.118* -0.158** -0.150** -0.151 -0.173 -0.065
(-1.79) (-2.41) (-2.23) (-1.15) (-1.00) (-0.33)
R2 0.072 0.137 0.138 0.132 0.133 0.183
N 81 79 79 75 75 74
Table C.8: Skewness of firm sizes for countries with > 100 observations (log sales in
2007): OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors. This table presents point estimates of regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three sig-
nificant digits. Columns labeled (1), (2), and so forth are regressions for
country-level skewness of firm sizes in 2007 measured by log sales adding
one independent variable at a time. Independent variables are the insti-
tutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions of
USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of GDP,
domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, and the financial
openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kaufmann et al.
(2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS. Coefficients
marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insti07 0.132*** 0.108** 0.031 0.036 -0.010 -0.031
(2.77) (2.03) (0.41) (0.39) (-0.11) (-0.28)
size07 0.227*** 0.204** 0.219** 0.242** 0.237*
(2.74) (2.35) (2.16) (2.15) (1.96)
devgen07 0.007* 0.011 0.011 0.013
(1.77) (1.53) (1.33) (1.22)






constant -0.214*** -0.242*** -0.300*** -0.251** -0.327** -0.345**
(-4.74) (-4.91) (-4.89) (-2.57) (-2.50) (-2.41)
R2 0.041 0.085 0.097 0.092 0.097 0.098
N 169 158 158 148 139 136
Table C.9: Skewness of firm sizes for countries for entire sample (log sales in 2007):
OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors. This table presents point estimates of regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three
significant digits. Columns labeled (1), (2), and so forth are regressions
for country-level skewness of firm sizes in 2007 measured by log sales
adding one independent variable at a time. Independent variables are the
institutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions
of USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of
GDP, domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, and the
financial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kauf-
mann et al. (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS.
Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively.
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One-digit SIC (0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
insti06 -1.190* -2.166*** -1.055*** -0.895** -1.109**
(-1.97) (-4.53) (-2.72) (-2.07) (-2.32)
devgen06 0.024 0.113*** 0.051* 0.078** 0.039
(0.54) (2.95) (1.71) (2.48) (1.02)
size06 -0.166 -0.766*** -0.374 -0.440** -0.469
(-0.59) (-2.96) (-1.64) (-2.13) (-1.59)
devfin06 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000
(-0.05) (0.20) (-0.15) (-0.68) (-0.04)
tradeopen06 0.004 0.006* 0.005 0.004 0.007*
(0.73) (1.71) (1.64) (1.21) (1.71)
finopen06 -0.036 -0.173 -0.070 -0.127 0.037
(-0.16) (-1.04) (-0.52) (-1.02) (0.22)
constant 7.873*** 7.732*** 8.273*** 8.327*** 8.387***
(9.94) (15.20) (18.00) (18.16) (15.43)
R2 0.167 0.310 0.152 0.132 0.127
N 89.000 107.000 119.000 110.000 118.000
Table C.10: Mean firm sizes for countries for entire sample (log sales in 2006):
OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors. This table presents point estimates of regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three
significant digits. Columns labeled (0), (1), and so forth are regressions
for country level skewness of firm sizes measured by log sales in 2006 for
one-digit SIC (0), (1), and so forth. Independent variables are the insti-
tutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions of
USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of GDP,
domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, and the finan-
cial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kaufmann
et al. (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS. Co-
efficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively.
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One-digit SIC (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
insti06 -0.313 -0.926** -0.993** -1.100** 0.428
(-0.91) (-2.50) (-2.29) (-2.07) (0.39)
devgen 0.035 0.045 0.074** 0.058 0.005
(1.19) (1.18) (2.27) (1.40) (0.07)
size06 -0.170 -0.505 -0.366 -0.239 -0.079
(-0.59) (-1.36) (-1.46) (-0.63) (-0.18)
devfin06 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(-0.23) (-0.34) (-0.38) (0.12) (0.02)
tradeopen06 0.006* 0.003 0.005 0.006 -0.000
(1.89) (1.07) (1.51) (1.42) (-0.08)
finopen06 -0.240** -0.137 -0.105 -0.067 -0.586
(-2.41) (-1.40) (-0.72) (-0.34) (-1.64)
constant 7.682*** 8.298*** 6.989*** 6.764*** 8.743***
(17.13) (18.34) (14.24) (11.12) (8.32)
R2 0.089 0.165 0.133 0.091 0.067
N 129.000 140.000 101.000 91.000 51.000
Table C.11: Mean firm sizes for countries for entire sample (log sales in 2006):
OLS regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard er-
rors. This table presents point estimates of regression coefficients with
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three
significant digits. Columns labeled (5), (6), and so forth are regressions
for country level skewness of firm sizes measured by log sales in 2006 for
one-digit SIC (5), (6), and so forth. Independent variables are the insti-
tutional quality index from Kaufmann et al. (2008), GDP in trillions of
USD, per capita GDP in thousands of USD, trade as percentage of GDP,
domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP, and the finan-
cial openness index of Chinn and Ito (2008). Data sources: Kaufmann
et al. (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008), WorldBank (2008), and ORBIS. Co-



























Table C.12: Pareto coefficients at country level (log sales in 2006) using OLS re-
gressions (Argentina to Japan). This table presents point estimates of
Pareto coefficients using the method in Gabaix and Ibragimov (2009),
rounded to three significant digits, and the R2 of each regression. Sam-
ple of 44 countries are those used in di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009).
Estimation procedure is described in the text. Data sources: ORBIS.






















Taiwan POC -0.300*** 0.869
Thailand -0.638*** 0.990
Ukraine -0.882*** 0.995
United Kingdom -0.488*** 0.973
Table C.13: Pareto coefficients at country level (log sales in 2006) using OLS regres-
sions (Latvia to United Kingdom). This table presents point estimates
of Pareto coefficients using the method in Gabaix and Ibragimov (2009),
rounded to three significant digits, and the R2 of each regression. Sam-
ple of 44 countries are those used in di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009).
Estimation procedure is described in the text. Data sources: ORBIS.









Table C.14: Pareto coefficients versus institutions (log sales in 2006): OLS regression
coefficients with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. This table
presents point estimates of regression coefficients with heteroscedasticity-
robust standard errors in brackets, rounded to three significant digits.
Independent variable is the institutional quality index from Kaufmann
et al. (2008). Data sources: Kaufmann et al. (2008) and ORBIS. Co-






V. Acharya, H. Shin, and T. Yorulmazer. Fire-sale fdi. London Business School
Working Paper, 2007.
V. Acharya, H. Shin, and T. Yorulmazer. Fire-sale fdi. London Business School
Working Paper, 2009.
V. V. Acharya, H. S. Shin, and T. Yorulmazer. Banks’s choice of liquidity: The role
of fire sales and entry. London Business School Working Paper, 2008.
A. R. Admati, P. Pfleiderer, and J. Zechner. Large shareholder activism, risk sharing,
and financial market equilibrium. The Journal of Political Economy, 102:1097–
1130, 1994.
M. Aguiar and G. Gopinath. Fire-sale foreign direct investment and liquidity crises.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 87:439–452, 2005.
R. Albuquerque and E. J. Schroth. Quantifying private benefits of control from a
structural model of block trades. Journal of Financial Economics (forthcoming),
2009.
R. Albuquerque and N. Wang. Corporate governance and asset prices in a two-country
model. Boston University and Columbia University working paper, 2006.
R. Albuquerque and N. Wang. Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing. The
Journal of Finance, 63:1–40, 2008.
G. Andrade, M. Mitchell, and E. Stafford. New evidence and perspectives on mergers.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15:103–120, 2001.
P. Angelini and A. Generale. On the evolution of firm size distributions. The American
Economic Review, 98(1):426438, 2008.
C. Arellano, Y. Bai, and J. Zhang. Firm dynamics and financial development. Uni-
versity of Michigan Working Paper, 2008.
D. K. Backus and G. W. Smith. Consumption and real exchange rates in dynamic
economies with non-traded goods. Journal of International Economics, 35:297–316,
1993.
144
D. K. Backus, P. Kehoe, F. Kydland, and T. F. Cooley. Frontiers of Business Cycle
Research. Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ, 1995.
Y. Bai and J. Zhang. Financial integration and international risk sharing. University
of Michigan and Arizona State University Working Paper, 2008.
M. Baxter and U. J. Jermann. The international diversification puzzle is worse than
you think. The American Economic Review, 87:170–180, 1997.
M. Baxter, U. J. Jermann, and R. G. King. Nontraded goods, nontraded factors, and
international non-diversification. Journal of International Economics, 44:211–229,
1998.
T. Beck, A. Demirguc-Kunt, L. Laeven, and R. Levine. Finance, firm size, and growth.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(7):13791405, 2008.
G. Bekaert and C. R. Harvey. Emerging markets finance. Journal of Empirical
Finance, 10(1-2):3–56, 2003.
D. D. Bergh. Predicting divestiture of unrelated acquisitions: An integrative model
of ex ante conditions. Strategic Management Journal, 18:715–731, 1997.
M. J. Brennan and H. H. Cao. International portfolio investment flows. Journal of
Finance, pages 1851–1880, 1997.
F. Broner and J. Ventura. Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization. CREI
Working Paper, 2008.
F. Broner and J. Ventura. Globalization and risk sharing. CREI Working Paper,
2009.
F. A. Broner, J. Ventura, and R. T. Fargas. Globalization and risk sharing. CREI
Working Paper, 2008.
L. M. Cabral and J. Mata. On the evolution of the firm size distribution: facts and
theory. American Economic Review, 93(4):10751090, 2003.
S. Champonnois. Comparing financial systems: a structural analysis. Rady School of
Management Working Paper, 2010.
S. Champonnois. What determines the distribution of firm sizes? Rady School of
Management Working Paper, 2008.
A. Chari and P. B. Henry. Risk sharing and asset prices: Evidence from a natural
experiment. The Journal of Finance, 59:1295–1324, 2004.
A. Chari, P. P. Ouimet, and L. L. Tesar. Acquiring control in emerging markets: Ev-
idence from the stock market. University of Michigan and Ross School of Business
Working Paper, 2007.
145
M. D. Chinn and H. Ito. A new measure of financial openness. Journal of Comparative
Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 10(3):309–322, 2008.
A. Civelli. International real business cycles, portfolio diversification and valuation
effects. Princeton University Working Paper, 2008.
M. Cleves, W. Gould, R. Gutierrez, and Y. Marchenko. An introduction to survival
analysis using Stata. Stata Press, 2008.
N. Coeurdacier. Do trade costs in goods market lead to home bias in equities? Journal
of International Economics, 2008.
N. Coeurdacier and P. O. Gourinchas. When bonds matter: Home bias in goods and
assets. Manuscript, London Business School, 2008.
N. Coeurdacier, R. Kollmann, and P. Martin. International portfolios, capital accu-
mulation and foreign assets dynamics. Journal of International Economics (forth-
coming), 2009.
H. L. Cole and M. Obstfeld. Commodity trade and international risk sharing. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 28:3–24, 1991.
T. Cooley, R. Marimon, and V. Quadrini. Aggregate consequences of limited contract
enforceability. Journal of Political Economy, 112, 2004.
T. F. Cooley and V. Quadrini. Financial markets and firm dynamics. American
Economic Review, 91(5):12861310, 2001.
M. Dahlquist, L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. Corporate governance and
the home bias. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38:87–110, 2003.
J. P. Danthine and J. B. Donaldson. Corporate governance meets macroeconomics:
Optimal contracting in general equilibrium. 2005.
P. M. DeMarzo and M. J. Fishman. Optimal long-term financial contracting. Review
of Financial Studies, 20:2079, 2007.
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